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Data aggregation is an important efficiency mechanism for large scale, resource
constrained networks such as wireless sensor networks (WSN). Security and privacy
are central for many data aggregation applications: (1) entities make decisions based
on the results of the data aggregation, so the entities need to be assured that the
aggregation process and in particular the aggregate data they receive has not been
corrupted (i.e., verify the integrity of the aggregation); (2) If the aggregation ap-
plication has been attacked, then the attack must be handled efficiently; (3) the
privacy requirements of the sensor network must be preserved.
The nature of both wireless sensor networks and data aggregation make it par-
ticularly challenging to provide the desired security and privacy requirements: (1)
sensors in WSN can be easily compromised and subsequently corrupted by an ad-
versary since they are unmonitored and have little physical security; (2) a malicious
aggregator node at the root of an aggregation subtree can corrupt not just its own
value but also that of all the nodes in its entire aggregation subtree; (3) since sensors
have limited resourced, it is crucial to achieve the security objectives while adopting
only cheap symmetric-key based operations and minimizing communication cost.
In this thesis, we first address the problem of efficient handling of adversarial
attacks on data aggregation applications in WSN. We propose and analyze a de-
tection and identification solution, presenting a precise cost-based characterization
when in-network data aggregation retains its assumed benefits under persistent at-
tacks. Second, we address the issue of data privacy in WSN in the context of data
aggregation. We introduce and analyze the problem of privacy-preserving integrity-
assured data aggregation (PIA) and show that there is an inherent tension between
preservation of data privacy and secure data aggregation. Additionally, we look at
the problem of PIA in publish-subscribe networks when there are multiple, collab-
orative yet competing subscribers.
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Data aggregation is an important primitive in wireless sensor networks (WSN).
Data aggregation is a process that collects data from different sources and expresses
the data, based on specific variables, in a summarized format. By eliminating redun-
dant or unnecessary information from transmitted data streams, data aggregation
can drastically improve the communication efficiency of a sensor network. This is es-
pecially desirable in resource-constrained networks, such as WSN, where it has been
shown that radio energy dominates total energy expenditure on a sensor [RSPS02].
A significant risk of data aggregation however is that a node that is captured
by an adversary can report arbitrary values as its aggregation result, thereby cor-
rupting not only its own measurements but also that of all the nodes in its entire
aggregation sub-tree. As a consequence, an adversary who captures nodes selec-
tively and strategically (e.g., close to the BS, refer to Figure 1.1), can corrupt the
entire network aggregation process, while incurring minimal cost and effort. This is
called the aggregation integrity problem.
















a b c d e
(a) Data aggregation (b) Adversary compromising one aggregator node.
Figure 1.1: Adversary attacking data aggregation (where aggregation function is
sum). By compromising one node, the adversary can control the data of the other
nodes in the network.
1. Reliable Data Aggregation: How can we efficiently handle integrity at-
tacks in a data aggregation application? This includes not just detection of
an attack, but also appropriate response to the attack. In particular, does
in-network data aggregation retain its assumed efficiency benefits when it is
applied in an adversarial setting?
2. Data Privacy: In many sensor applications, it is crucial that the privacy of
the sensed values is preserved with respect to querying entities that receive
the network data aggregate. How can we preserve the privacy of sensor data
from the querying entities, while said entities also verify the integrity of the
aggregation process? What are the tradeoffs between privacy and security in
data aggregation?
This thesis presents advances on both the above issues. Towards reliable data
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aggregation, we provide a scheme where an attack against the integrity of data
aggregation is not only detected but also identified. We analyze the scheme and
present a cost-based characterization of the scheme that shows when data aggre-
gation no longer provides its assumed efficiency benefits. Towards preserving data
privacy in integrity-assured data aggregation, we first define and model the problem
and present several classes of solutions. Our analysis of the solutions shows that
there exists an intrinsic tradeoff between data privacy and integrity-assured data
aggregation.
Additionally, we consider the problem of privacy-preserving integrity-assured
data aggregation in publish-subscribe networks (defined in Section 1.3) which share
many characteristics with WSN. In particular, we consider the scenario where there
are multiple competing subscribers who want to determine the integrity of an aggre-
gate result. We present a collaborative solution where privacy-preserving integrity-
assured data aggregation can be achieved fairly across all subscribers. In the rest of
this chapter, we provide an informal, comprehensive account of our contributions.
1.1 Reliable Data Aggregation
To achieve reliable data aggregation, and, in particular, to assure the integrity
of aggregation process, it is important (i) to detect an adversary’s presence in the
network (i.e., by discovering aggregated-data corruption) and (ii) to identify and
remove (i.e., revoke [CGPM05]) the captured nodes which corrupt data aggregates.
Most recent work on secure data aggregation has focused exclusively on effi-
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cient detection of integrity breach in the aggregation process; e.g., [HE03, CPS06,
YWZC06, PSP03, FD08]. While detection of integrity breach is the first necessary
step to achieving secure data aggregation, it does not provide a fully adequate re-
sponse to malicious-node behavior; i.e., detection of integrity breach alone does not
unambiguously identify and remove specific malicious nodes from the network. Ex-
clusive reliance on detection of corrupt aggregate results would leave the network
unprotected against repeated attacks that deny service to the BS. An effective ap-
proach to handling this problem would (i) identify corrupted nodes and remove them
from the aggregation tree (e.g., by node revocation), and (ii) ensure continued, but
gracefully degraded aggregation services, even during an attack period. Identifica-
tion and removal of corrupted nodes has the added benefit of acting as a deterrent
against some potential adversaries who might avoid the risk of being identified.
Problem. We consider an aggregation scenario where a subset of nodes is corrupted
by an adversary. A corrupted node can (i) insert a false data into the network or
(ii) if it is an aggregating node, output a false aggregation result. The goal of the
corrupted node is to convince the base station to accept an invalid value. Since the
network cannot protect against the insertion of incorrect aggregation values without
assuming specific distributions on the environmental data [Wag04, YWZC06], we
simply assume that all valid sensor inputs r must be within a given range r1 < r < r2.
Our objective is to (i) detect an attack in the network, (ii) identify malicious nodes,
(iii) ensure graceful degradation of the aggregate with respect to the number of
corrupted nodes in the network, while retaining the efficiency advantages of data
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aggregation.
A straight-forward method of achieving the first three stated objectives without
retaining in-network aggregation, henceforth called the baseline scheme, would be to
detect the presence of malicious behavior in the network [FD08, CPS06], and then
require each node to directly transmit their data without aggregation along with a
message authentication code (MAC) to the BS. By eliminating in-network aggrega-
tion, we would trivially remove any attacks on the aggregation process. The BS can
then identify any malicious nodes that inject false data by range testing the received
data. If the corrupted nodes are persistently malicious, the BS can identify all cor-
rupted nodes. Furthermore, the BS itself could reconstruct the network aggregate
by disregarding the data received from all malicious nodes and finally guarantee
the correctness of the reconstructed aggregate based on the security of the MAC
protocol and data-validity verification. Although the baseline scheme would satisfy
the first three objectives mentioned above, it would do so at the cost of removing
in-network data aggregation and its associated communication efficiency. For this
reason, we do not consider the baseline scheme to be a useful solution. Nevertheless,
it constitutes a practical lower bound on the performance of any secure aggregation
solution satisfying our three objectives above. That is, an efficient solution must
have better performance than the baseline scheme; otherwise, the baseline scheme
becomes preferable, and the entire notion of in-network data aggregation ceases to
be useful, in hostile environments.
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1.1.1 Related Work
Chan et al. [CPS06] propose a fully distributed aggregation verification algo-
rithm, called the Secure Hierarchical In-network Aggregation (SHIA), which detects
the existence of any misbehavior in the aggregation process. The algorithm per-
fectly satisfies its objective as a detection mechanism; however it is not intended
to address our problem as it aims neither at the identification and removal of ad-
versary nodes nor at providing continuous, but gracefully degraded, service under
attack. Similarly, the work of Frikken and Dougherty [FD08], which improves the
performance of SHIA, aims only at the detection of attacks against the aggregation
process.
In contrast to SHIA, Hu and Evans [HE03] and Yang et al. [YWZC06] propose
detection algorithms that also allow identification of corrupted nodes. However
because both approaches use centralized verification, the incurred communication
cost approaches that of the baseline scheme—O(n) for a network of size n—when
in-network data aggregation ceases to be useful. In contrast, the cost of our scheme
is logarithmic in n.
Another solution which uses a centralized approach is proposed by Haghani et
al. [HPP+07] who extend SHIA. A corrupted node is detected via successive polling
of the layers of a commitment tree (generated during the aggregation process) by
the BS. Although this work is closest to ours in spirit, it differs in three fundamental
ways. First, it incurs a high cost as it not only relies on centralized identification
but also each run of the algorithm identifies only one malicious node at a time. In
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the worst case, to detect c malicious nodes in a network of size n, O(nc) messages
are generated per link. Second, the performance analysis and adversary model
presented [HPP+07] does not include a comparison with the baseline scheme where
identification of adversary nodes incurs a cost of only O(n). Hence, it is unclear
at what point the proposed scheme ceases to be useful and the baseline scheme
becomes preferable. Finally, Haghani et al. do not provide network service during
the period of the attack.
Group Testing. The identification of corrupted nodes is directly related to the
problem of group testing, which strives to identify defective items of a given set
through a sequence of tests. Each test is performed on a subset of all items and
indicates whether the subset contains a defective item. In combinatorial group
testing, it is assumed that the number of defectives in a set is constant. This
number can be either known or unknown at the time of testing. Group testing is
efficient when the number of defectives in a sample space is small compared to the
total number of samples [DH00]. This is an analogous setup to untrusted sensor
networks which are characterized as large, densely packed network of sensor nodes.
1.1.2 Our Contributions
In Chapter 3, we propose a divide-and-conquer approach to tracing and remov-
ing malicious nodes from the network which achieves the three objectives stated
above. Briefly, our approach recursively (i) partitions suspicious subsets of the
network, (ii) runs a given ‘test’ in each partition to check the correctness of the
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sub-aggregation values, (iii) if the result reveals possible node corruption, the set
is tagged as suspicious; otherwise, it is considered to be good and the associated
sub-aggregate value is retained. Hence, our algorithm allows for the incremental
reconstruction of lost data from sub-aggregated value, over the course of its execu-
tion. The algorithm terminates when it has isolated all the malicious nodes in the
network. The partition test is a primitive which we use in secure aggregation.
The identification algorithm is designed and optimized with respect to the
communication cost for an arbitrary number of malicious nodes. We prove the cor-
rectness of the algorithm and evaluate its performance using an analysis method
inspired by the field of combinatorial group testing [DH00]. Our results illustrate
the relationship between the efficiency of malicious-node identification and the num-
ber and distribution of these nodes. In particular, we define a precise cost-based
threshold when in-network data aggregation ceases to be useful in hostile environ-
ments.
1.2 Privacy in Secure Data Aggregation
The principal approach in verifying the integrity of data aggregation is to
recompute the aggregate using the original, raw sensed (measured) data, and verify
that the alleged aggregate is identical or close enough to the recomputed value
[DDHV03, HE03, PSP03, GSW04, YWZC06].
This type of verification however is in direct conflict with data privacy pro-
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Figure 1.2: The problems of (b) data aggregation integrity and (c) privacy-
preserving aggregation have previously been considered as independent problems.
In this work, we analyze the relationship and tension that exists when (d) these two
problems interact.
consider a scenario where a WSN is deployed remotely from a querying user (Fig-
ure 1.2a). The owner of the network controls the access of the user to the network
data by allowing the user to learn only specific statistics of the data. Here data
aggregation is also used as a privacy primitive since it controls the disclosure of the
information measured in the network. The user wants to verify the integrity of the
received aggregate y (Figure 1.2b) and to perform such verification, the user needs
access to individual sensor data. At the same time, however, the network owner
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does not want the user to access the raw data for privacy reasons (Figure 1.2c).
We are interested in the tension that results between preserving data privacy and
verifying aggregate integrity (Figure 1.2d). We refer to this problem as the Privacy-
preserving, Integrity-assured data Aggregation (PIA) problem.
Privacy. Preserving privacy is important in applications where the behavior of
individuals or businesses can be deduced from sensed data in a monitored environ-
ment. It is often easy to deduce sensitive information based on seemingly innocuous
sensed data; e.g., the behavior of a household can be tracked or profiled by mon-
itoring their electrical usage [Har89]. Since sensing is in effect a passive act—as
it can be done without the knowledge of the observed party or environment—the
observed party has very limited ability to control the extent of information that
is disclosed by the sensors. Hence maintaining the privacy of sensed data can be
important to parties in the sensed environment. Similarly, sensor data privacy can
be important to a service provider that provides service based on the status of the
network-sensed data. The service provider may want to guarantee the privacy of the
observed party as it can face liability from regulators and customers. Hence both
service providers and their customers must rely on the network owner/operator to
provide sensor-data privacy. Unless privacy challenges are addressed by the sensor
network owner/operator, wide-spread adoption of WSNs in many applications will
be impeded by both the customers’ and the service-providers’ legitimate concerns.
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1.2.1 Motivating Example
To further motivate the PIA problem, consider the advanced metering infras-
tructure (AMI) [Fol08]. An AMI is a system that consists of a large scale sensor
network of advanced meters that measure a consumer’s energy usage. This infor-
mation is then sent via wired or wireless links to utilities and service providers, and
used for example (i) to assist in a change in energy usage of the customers from
their normal consumption patterns as a response to changes in price or (ii) to ser-
vice the customer with a more efficient and reliable energy service. Because of the
large amount of data that is generated as well as the fact that in many scenarios
service providers only require high-level statistical information, the measured data is
aggregated before being transmitted to the providers. Since decisions that providers
make based on collected information have great economic promise, it is crucial for


















Figure 1.3: An example AMI architecture
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At the same time, utilities and service providers in AMI systems must handle
privacy concerns from customers and political opposition [Fol08]. AMI directly puts
privacy interests at risk because its core purpose is to collect information related
to a particular household or business. Meters can collect usage data as well as
detailed status and diagnostic information from networked sensors and smart appli-
ances. These data can show directly when and where people are present, as well as
what they are doing. Hence, providers must be able to verify the integrity of data
aggregation without breaching user privacy.
In this paper, we explore the inherent tension that results between preserving
data privacy and verifying aggregate integrity. That is, we aim at providing solutions
that enable both aggregate-integrity verification and preservation of sensor data
privacy.
1.2.2 Related Work
Existing security solutions in data aggregation deal with two general problems:
confidentiality and aggregation integrity. The objective of data confidentiality in ag-
gregation is to ensure that the data transmitted by sensor nodes cannot be discovered
by unauthorized entities in the system.
Various solutions have been proposed for preserving aggregate-data confi-
dentiality, including handling hop-by-hop [WGS06] and end-to-end confidentiality
[CMT05]. These solutions, however, neither preserve the integrity of the aggre-





User verifies y by 
recomputing f(x1,...,xn)





Each sensor verifies y by
recomputing f(x1,...,xn)
If all sensors agree, then 
user accepts y 
Figure 1.4: The difference between centralized and distributed aggregation integrity
verification models.
is, a user that receives an aggregate is unable to verify the validity of the aggrega-
tion process and ensure that a malicious aggregator node has not compromised the
process.
Various solutions for aggregate-integrity verification have been proposed in
both the single aggregator model [PSP03, DDHV03, ZDL06, Wag04] and the “in-
network” aggregator model [HE03, CPS06, GSW04, YWZC06, DDHV03, TG08],
which uses a hierarchy of aggregators. These solutions fall into two classes: central-
ized and distributed integrity verification (see Figure 1.4). Although the integrity
of the aggregate is verified in both classes by recomputing the aggregation function
using the raw data, the classes differ in who performs the aggregation recomputation.
In centralized verification [HE03, PSP03, GSW04, YWZC06], the querying
user receives the raw data to determine if the aggregate has been computed cor-






























Figure 1.5: Summary of PIA solutions, where n is the network size. ‘Integrity
verification cost’ upper bounds the number of messages received and transmitted by
each sensor.
themselves recompute the aggregation function using the measurements of the other
sensors. If all nodes agree with the same result, the aggregation is considered secure.
The main advantage of the distributed approach to centralized is the spreading of
the communication through out the network for in-network aggregation.
1.2.3 Contributions
In Chapter 4, we define the problem of Privacy-preserving Integrity-assured
Aggregation (PIA). Although the problems of aggregation integrity verification and
privacy preservation have been independently considered in the past, this is the first
work that analyzes the interaction of these two problems. We analyze the attack
models and derive the security requirements, focusing on the single aggregator model
(Figure 1.2a).
We propose four distinct symmetric-key solutions that address this problem.
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Our results, summarized in Figure 1.5, clearly show that there is an intrinsic tension
between providing sensor data privacy and integrity verification algorithms.
In the centralized integrity verification model, the tradeoff appears between
the measure of data privacy and the set of aggregation functions that the integrity
assurance algorithm supports. In particular, to achieve perfect data privacy—i.e.,
not leak any data—we cannot use a large subset of aggregation functions, including
comparison based functions such as maximum. We can only support comparison
based functions if we weaken the privacy requirement and preserve privacy of only
the distribution of the data.
In the distributed verification model, privacy is traded off for an expanded
range of aggregation functions supported by the integrity-verification algorithm,
as well as its associated communication cost. For example, to support all possible
aggregation functions and maintain privacy, the cost of aggregation becomes so high
that the assumed aggregation benefits (i.e., reduced communication cost) disappear.
1.3 PIA Problem in Publish-Subscribe Systems
The privacy-preserving integrity-assured data aggregation (PIA) problem is
relevant in many publish-subscribe (pub-sub) system. A pub-sub system [BHGB07,
CRW01, RPS06, SBC+98] consists of a large number of publishers submitting in-
formation to the system and a (smaller) set of subscribers who register to receive
publications of interest. Such systems often cover wide-area networks and involve









Figure 1.6: Publisher-subscriber model
get subscribers. Pub-sub systems have many applications, from smart electric grid
systems [sma] to stock quotes to building management systems (BMS) [KNSN05].
Data aggregation is important in such systems because it can improve both the
privacy and the efficiency of the system. In many scenarios, subscribers need only
high-level statistical information derived from the publishers’ raw data. For exam-
ple, BMSs keep track of aggregate occupancy information for sections of buildings.
Furthermore, it is possible that publishers do not want to disclose their confidential
raw data to the subscribers. Computing and disseminating only the aggregate of
the data—that is, removing all but the necessary information—allows the privacy of
the published data to be observed against unauthorized subscribers. The efficiency
benefits of data aggregation in the routing network of the pub-sub system is also
important as pub-sub systems can consist of thousands of publisher nodes.
The PIA problem is a major challenge in such aggregation systems. Since
wide-area pub-sub systems usually span multiple administrative domains, publisher,
routing and subscriber nodes do not always trust each other. A malicious (routing)
16
aggregator node can effectively control the data of all the publisher nodes in its
aggregation subtree. Such an attacker can then trick the monitoring applications
(that act as subscribers) into making unsafe control decisions by providing incorrect
aggregates. Subscribers therefore need to ensure that the data aggregation process
performed by the untrusted routing nodes is correct; i.e. ensure the integrity of the
aggregation process. This verification needs to be done such that the confidentiality
of the raw data from the publishers is preserved. In other words, subscriber should
be able to verify the integrity of the aggregate without the publishers’ raw data.
In this part of the thesis, we study the PIA problem for multiple subscribers in a
pub-sub system. In particular, we consider a setting where multiple subscribers need
to verify the correctness of an alleged data aggregate in a competitive environment—
that is, a subscriber who gets this information before others can gain a decided
competitive (e.g. economic) advantage.
As an example, consider the pub-sub system used in the smart electric grid
system. Here publishers are electricity meters in many home (where the meters are
connected to a wide-area network), and each publisher (i.e., a meter) reports the
real-time power demand of each household. Subscribers of the pub-sub system are
electricity suppliers that receives the aggregate power demand of each geographical
region in a wide service area. Since those electricity suppliers compete with each
other in the electricity market, a supplier of electricity can get a distinct economic
advantage if it obtains a true aggregate power demand in a timely manner when














Figure 1.7: A smart electric grid with multiple competing electric suppliers.
electricity by considering a rapid shift of the power demand.
When we provide an integrity-assured aggregate to multiple subscribers, we
need to consider a new threat model with malicious subscribers. A malicious sub-
scriber can perform a wide variety of attacks. For example, it can try to cheat
the other subscribers by convincing them that a valid aggregate is actually invalid.
It can also mount a denial-of-service attack by stopping the validity proof to go
through. This attack is specially strong when the adversary is stealthy, i.e., can
escape detection. In this problem, we focus on a stealthy attacker whose goal is to
cheat by convincing other subscribers in the system of a false aggregation integrity
verification result and do this without detection.
1.3.1 Prior Work
Although many researchers [Khu05, Mik02, PEB06, PEB07, OP01, RR06,
SL07, WCEW02, ZS06] have studied security issues for pub-sub systems, there is
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very little security research for those that support in-network aggregation. Ahmad
et al. [AK06] developed a secure additive aggregation protocol in a large-scale overlay
network. Their protocol uses an additively homomorphic public-key cryptosystem
to protect confidential data from intermediate aggregation nodes. However, their
scheme does not address the issue of integrity discussed in this paper.
No existing aggregation solution considers either collaborative subscribers or
fairness in aggregation verification. The work closest to ours in spirit is by Minami et
al. [MLWB08] who recently proposed an integrity-assured data aggregation scheme
for pub-sub systems. Each subscriber can verify the integrity of the aggregation
process independently. Since the proposed system also requires all subscribers to
share the same secret, a malicious subscriber can convince other subscribers of an
invalid aggregate value. The authors address this problem using a delayed verifica-
tion approach in which a trusted third party (TTP) synchronizes the disclosure of
a secrets for verifying an aggregate to each subscriber at each round of publication.
The existence of such a TTP and the synchronous communication channel may not
be practical in scenarios consisting of multiple untrusted domains. Furthermore the
TTP introduces a single point of failure in the system, which we want to avoid.
In the area of sensor networks, a number of secure aggregation schemes [CMT05,
CPS06, GSW04, HLN+07, PSP03] have been proposed. None of the solutions deal
with the problem of multiple sink nodes (i.e., base stations). Furthermore, a sensor
network has a different communication model from that of a pub-sub system. In
particular, all entities, including sensors, base station and the querying user have
bidirectional communication channels and the base station or the user can use an
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authenticated broadcast. In contrast, an authenticated broadcast is inefficient in
a pub-sub system, and it could cause a long latency for the delivery of an aggre-
gate. Also, many pub-sub systems define privileges for the publication of data to
prevent an adversary from performing a denial-of-service attack by sending bogus
messages. Such pub-sub systems assume unidirectional communication between the
routing network and the subscribers, that is, subscribers cannot send messages to
publishers or routing nodes of the pub-sub system.
An interesting approach towards integrity-assured data aggregation in sensor
networks is the distributed verification approach proposed by Chan et al. [CPS06].
Chan et al.’s scheme, SHIA, allows a BS to verify the integrity of the in-network
aggregation process within a sensor network by sharing the responsibility of the
verification by all the sensor nodes in the network. SHIA, however, requires com-
munication from a BS to the sensor network, while a pub-sub system does not
usually support such backward communication channels from subscribers to routing
nodes of the system because of various reasons such as efficiency. Additionally, SHIA
does not consider the case where multiple base stations (i.e., subscribers) receive the
same aggregate data.
Haber et al. [HHSY06] address the problem of verifying the integrity of ag-
gregate queries on outsourced databases. They develop a verification protocol that
allows a user to verify the integrity of the sum of multiple values in a database
without seeing those individual values. This query is processed by an untrusted
service provider that is different from the trusted database owner. Since a single
database owner provides all of the individual values for the sum, their protocol can
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ensure the integrity of the sum by providing the user with a Merkle hash tree of
commitments to the individual values, so that the user can verify the authenticity of
those commitments with a digital signature on the root node of the hash tree created
by the database owner. This solution of constructing a single digital signature on
multiple commitments is not applicable to our problem, since each individual data
is provided by a different publisher.
1.3.2 Our Contributions
Our goal in Chapter 5 of this thesis, is to design a privacy-preserving integrity-
assured aggregation solution that is both collaborative and fair. A scheme is collab-
orative if a subscriber can verify the validity of an alleged aggregate if and only if
when all other subscribers are available and have received the alleged aggregate and
proof of aggregation correctness. We introduce the notion of fairness : subscribers
verify the integrity of an alleged aggregate so that they can either all correctly verify
the aggregation process or they can detect all cheating subscribers.
We develop a new PIA protocol for multiple subscribers in a pub-sub sys-
tem. Our scheme is based on the aggregate-commit-prove framework of Chan et
al. [CPS06] and Przydatek et al. [PSP03] where each node constructs an aggregate
value and commitment structure that incorporates their own published data. Our
scheme allows multiple subscribers to verify the integrity of an aggregate in a collab-
orative and fair way, without assuming to have a trusted third party. Our scheme
focuses on the sum aggregation function, which extends easily to other aggregation
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functions, such as count and min/max [CPS06].
In our aggregation protocol, secret key shares are distributed amongst the
subscribers so that when the shares are combined together, the integrity of the ag-
gregation process can be verified. This is equivalent to an (n, n)-threshold secret
sharing scheme. Thus, a group of subscribers can verify the integrity of an aggre-
gate if and only if every subscriber collaborates following our protocol; a strictly
smaller subgroup cannot learn any information about the integrity of the aggregate.
Furthermore, publisher and routing nodes construct a commitment value for each
subscriber that forces them to act honestly. If any subscriber misbehaves and does
not follow the protocol, they are detected and identified by the other subscribers.
(a) PIA adversary and security  models




(1) Integrity of aggregation assured
     (against integrity adversary)
(2) Privacy of sensors preserved















(1) Integrity of aggregation assured
     (against integrity adversary)
(2) Privacy of sensors preserved
     (against privacy adversary)
(3) Fairness of subscriber computation
     (against subscriber adversary)
Figure 1.8: PIA adversary and security models for (a) single and (b) multiple sub-
scriber model.
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We propose a new security model with three types of adversaries: (i) a stealthy
integrity-adversary that compromises aggregating nodes with the aim of falsify-
ing the aggregation result; (ii) a privacy-adversary that compromises subscribers
with the aim of learning the raw published values; and (iii) a stealthy subscriber-
adversary that compromises subscribers with the the aim of falsifying the aggrega-
tion verification result. This model is summarized in Figure 1.8. We analyze our
protocol in this security model and formally prove the security of our scheme in this
model.
1.4 Thesis Organization
This thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2.1, we present a short overview
of wireless sensor networks and the role and modeling of data aggregation in sensor
networks. In Chapter 3, we address the problem of resilient data aggregation in an
adversarial setting. Chapter 4 addresses the problem of privacy-preserving integrity-
assured data aggregation (PIA) and in Chapter 5 we look at the application of the




2.1 Wireless Sensor Networks
Wireless sensor networks (WSN) are ad hoc networks formed by typically
large numbers of small sensing devices with the ability to communicate amongst
themselves and also with an external base station. The sensors could be scattered
randomly in harsh environments such as a battlefield or deterministically placed at
specified locations. The sensors coordinate among themselves to form a communi-
cation network such as a single multihop network or a hierarchical organization with
several clusters and cluster heads.
The development of WSNs was originally motivated by military applications
such as battlefield surveillance. However, wireless sensor networks are now used in
many civilian application areas where there exists distributed interaction between
sensors and the physical environment. Example applications include (i) wildfire
tracking and monitoring [MCP+02, DS05], (ii) surveillance systems and burglar
alarms, (iii) health and biomedical monitoring systems such as monitoring the
health status of cattle stocks on farms [BKM04, SCD+05], (iv) disaster recovery
systems such as monitoring the health of buildings or incremental shifts of ice and
snow in alpine mountains, (v) industrial automation or supervisory control and









(b) SCADA systems such as power grid
sensor wireless communication
(c) Healthcare
Figure 2.1: Applications of wireless sensor networks
military warfare[AGHS01] (see Figure 2.1). Many of these systems consist of a
distributed network of nodes that measure (sense) the environment from different
vantage points; a global view of the network can be constructed by a base station
for an outside user by collecting the sensed data and upon analysis of the emergent
properties, appropriate action can be initiated.
In addition to one or more sensors, each node in a WSN is typically equipped
with a radio transceiver or other wireless communications device, a small microcon-
troller, and an energy source, usually a battery. The size of a single sensor node
can vary from shoebox-sized nodes down to devices the size of grain of dust. The
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cost of sensor nodes is similarly variable, ranging from hundreds of dollars to a few
cents, depending on the size of the sensor network and the complexity required of
individual sensor nodes. Size and cost constraints on sensor nodes result in cor-
responding constraints on resources such as energy, memory, computational speed
and bandwidth. [RM04] provides an overview of the range of current sensor devices.
Sensor nodes are generally characterized by their constrained resources, high failure
rates and low physical security and unattended operation.
2.2 Data Aggregation Models
WSNs are generally assumed to be large scale networks where large amounts of
data can be generated. Since sensor nodes are energy constrained it is inefficient for
all the sensors to transmit their raw data directly to the base station. In addition,
data generated from neighboring sensors is often redundant and highly correlated.
Data aggregation attempts to collect the most critical data from the sensors and
make it available to the base station in an energy efficient manner. In such a
setting, certain nodes in the network, called aggregators, collect raw data from the
sensors, aggregate the data locally and forward only the data aggregate to the base
station.
Network aggregation is generally classed into two distinct models: the single
aggregator model and the in-network aggregator model, see Figure 2.2.
The single aggregator model considers a setup of n sensor nodesN = {s1, ..., sn}
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user
Figure 2.2: Single aggregator and in-network aggregation models
point each sensor node takes a measurement and sends this data to the aggregator.
The goal of the aggregator is to compute an aggregate value y that summarizes the
sensor readings x1, . . . , xn using the aggregation function f : thus y = f(x1, · · · , xn).
The aggregate value is then forwarded to an external user U or a base station (BS),
possibly in response to a query.
This simplified and abstract model of the aggregation network inherently ig-
nores the structure of the multi-hop network and assumes that each sensor node has
a separate and authenticated link to either the base station or the user. The result-
ing communication reduction is limited to the link between the aggregator and the
external user. The single aggregator model is therefore not scalable to large sensor
deployments.
In order to reduce both energy and communication bandwidth in the net-
work, it is useful to move the integration and filtering of data into the network
itself. In-network aggregation is a mechanism for adopting multiple and hierarchi-
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cal aggregators within the network. The in-network aggregator model assumes the
following.
Consider a multi-hop network of n sensor nodesN = {s1, ..., sn} which consists
of a set of aggregating nodes A and a set of sensing nodes S, where A,S ∈ N and
A ∪ S = N . For simplicity, we ignore other states of nodes within the network
such as idle or simply forwarding. We assume that A ∩ S 6= ∅ as a sensor can both
sense and aggregate. Although the network can contain multiple base stations, we
assume that the aggregation round is in response to query from one base station.
We present the network using the following parameters: (N ,A,S).
Aggregation is implemented over a hierarchical routing topology, which can
be based on clusters, chains, trees or grids. In general, in-networking aggregation
assumes a tree-based topology based on a spanning tree over all the nodes in the
network rooted at the base station. The properties of the spanning tree, such as
minimum energy or delay, are considered outside the scope of this work.
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Chapter 3
Efficient Handling of Integrity Attacks
In this Chapter, we address the problem of integrity attack detection and
response in a data aggregation application in WSN.
3.1 System Model
Consider a multihop network of untrusted sensor nodes and a single trusted
BS. The system administrator or user that resides outside the network interacts
with the network through the BS interface. For brevity, subsequently we refer to
any requests made by this external entity via the BS, as simply requests by the BS.
We assume that each sensor has a unique identifier v and a unique secret key shared
with the BS, Kv. The sensor network continuously monitors its environment and
measures some environmental data. We divide time into epochs; during each time
epoch, the BS broadcasts a data request to the nodes in the network and nodes
forward their data response back to the BS. Data can be forwarded individually or
as an aggregate.
We model node corruption in the network as a function of the number c and
the distribution of the corrupted nodes. Each sensor node v belongs either to the
good set G or the malicious or corrupted set M . A network instance is defined as
N = {∀v in network : v ∈ G ∨ v ∈ M} where |M | = c and G = N \ M . The
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collection of all N for a given c, constitutes a family of networks Nc.
For the purpose of computing the aggregate, we assume that the sensed envi-
ronment (e.g., temperature) changes minimally with respect to the duration of the
identification algorithm. This is a practical assumption as once malicious activity is
detected, the identification algorithm is promptly executed. Moreover the algorithm
terminates after a small, constant number of rounds.
3.2 Adversary Model
We assume that the network is deployed in an adversarial environment where
the adversary can corrupt an arbitrary number of nodes. Once a node is corrupted,
the adversary has total control over the secret data of the node as well as the sub-
sequent behavior of the sensor node. We assume that a corrupted node persistently
misbehaves by inducing the BS to accept an ‘illegal’ value. An illegal value is defined
based on the adversary objectives which is to induce the BS to accept a data value
which is not already achievable by direct data injection.
A direct data injection attack occurs when an adversary modifies the data
readings reported by the nodes under its direct control, under the constraint that
only legal readings in [r1, r2] are reported [CPS06]. In the case of a single data values,
this means that the data value transmitted is outside the legal reading of [r1, r2].
This is called a false data injection attack. In the case of data aggregation, the
objective of the adversary is to tamper with the aggregation process such that the BS
accepts an aggregation result which is not achievable by the direct data injection. We
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refer to this type of attack as a false aggregation attack. An aggregation protocol is
considered secure if the adversary cannot successfully launch such an attack [CPS06].
3.3 Performance Measure.
We use link cost as a metric to analyze our algorithm. Link cost is defined
as the total number of messages transmitted over a particular link in the network
and is important as it determines how quickly nodes in the network exhaust their
energy supply. Such nodes are often core to the connectivity or the functionality of
the network and their loss can lead to network partitioning or denial of service.
3.4 Identification Algorithm
The main objective of our algorithm is to recursively isolate the malicious
nodes in the network and thus render the adversary inoperative. The algorithm is
initiated once misbehavior is detected in the network (e.g., via [CPS06]) and is exe-
cuted over a number of rounds, following an intuitive divide-and-conquer approach.
In each round the algorithm partitions the suspicious subsets of the network and
performs a partition test on the newly formed groups. The number of subsets a
suspicious group is partitioned into is called the partition degree. The partition test
consists of nodes aggregating their data and verifying the integrity of their aggre-
gation process. The test has two outputs: ‘pure’ if all the nodes in the partition
are good and ‘impure’ if there is at least one malicious node in the group. The
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Figure 3.1: Identification algorithm on an input of 12 nodes, m = 2.
By distributing the localization of the malicious nodes, the scheme simply
keeps track of the lower bound on the number of malicious nodes in the network
and increases the bound only when the findings of the scheme up to that point imply
that this is valid.
Algorithm 1 Identification
Input: All the nodes in the network N ∈ Nc, partition degree m > 1, where integer m is
the number of partitions a group divides into in each iteration.
Output: A result set M of malicious nodes and a result set G of good nodes, such that
M ∪G = N
Let t = 1 be the lower bound on the number of malicious nodes in the network and
S = ∪ti=1Si denote the current set of suspicious nodes, S1 = N .
1. For j = 1, · · · , t, BS requests partition Sj to be divided into m disjoint partitions
(using partition rule viz. Algorithm 2). The collection of subdivided sets form the current
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collection S. Set t to be the cardinality of set S.
2. For j = 1, · · · , t, if |Sj | > 1, the nodes in partition Sj partition themselves into
groups of size nm and execute partition test. BS verifies the purity of each partition.
3. The BS learns the status of each node for the following round (details are provided
in the next section). For j = 1, · · · , t, if Sj is pure (i.e., all the nodes are good), then
G = G ∪ Sj; else if Sj is impure (i.e., there is at least one misbehaving node) and a
singleton set, then M = M ∪Sj and decrement t. Adjust the indices of the remaining sets,
{Sj} appropriately, to include only sets that are impure and non-singleton. If t > 0, go to
step 1 (next round), else quit as all malicious nodes have been traced.
We can model the divide-and-conquer approach of Algorithm 1 as the pruning
process of an m-ary tree T where each tree vertex is associated with a partition test.
The root of tree T is associated with the input set N and each round i is associated
with level (i+ 1) of the tree. This is because the identification algorithm is initiated
when misbehavior is detected in the network and therefore the test at level 1 has
been already executed. If a partition X is tested pure, then all the descendants of
the associated vertex are pruned; otherwise the set X is re-partitioned. Fig. 3.1(b)
presents an unpruned identification tree for a network of 12 nodes and partition
degree m = 2. Fig. 3.1(c) and (d) show how the tree can be pruned when the
network contains one and six corrupted nodes respectively. Fig. 3.1(a) shows how
the identification tree corresponds to the recursive isolation of the captured nodes
on the physical network.
Next we define a novel partition rule which generalizes the bijective rule of Du
and Hwang [DH93] (see Appendix A). This algorithm partitions the network such
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that the identification tree contains at most one incomplete subtree. Intuitively
a complete tree of n nodes executes less or equal number of tests than an incom-
plete tree of n nodes as the complete tree contains less vertices (where each vertex
corresponds to one test).
Algorithm 2 Partitioning Rule
Input: Set X, maximum number of partitions m.
Output: Result sets {Xi}, such that ∪Xi = X.
Let i = 1 denote the new subset (Xi) to be determined.
1. Choose Xi to contain mdlogm |X|e−1 nodes.
2. Update set X = X \Xi to exclude the newly formed subset. If less than m subsets are
formed and X has more than m− 1 nodes, then increment i and go to Step 1.
Else if X is not a singleton set, increment i and add the remaining nodes in X to Xi.
Else if X is a singleton set, then X cannot be partitioned anymore.
3.4.1 Partition Test
The test that nodes perform in each newly formed partition is a fundamental
step in our algorithm. There are two types of tests depending if the partition is a
singleton or otherwise.
Tests for Non-singleton Partitions. In all non-singleton partitions (parti-
tions containing more than one node), data is aggregated and the partition leader
directly transmits the partition aggregate (via multi-hop) to the BS, which veri-
fies the integrity of the aggregation process and hence the integrity of the nodes
within that partition. In the general case, Algorithm 1 can be composed with any
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aggregation-verification algorithm that does not depend on a fixed partition and
provides provable guarantees. Next we show how we can modify SHIA to satisfy
these conditions.
SHIA extends the aggregate-commit-prove framework of [PSP03]. In the
aggregate-commit phase of the algorithm, a cryptographic commitment tree (hash
tree) is built based on the sensor readings and the aggregation process. This forces
the adversary to choose a fixed aggregation topology and set of aggregation results.
In the prove phase of the algorithm, each sensor independently verifies that the
final aggregate has incorporated its sensed reading correctly. Specifically each sen-
sor reconstructs the commitment structure and ensures that the adversary has not
modified or discarded the contributions of the node.
SHIA cannot be used as is because it assumes that the BS knows the exact
set of nodes which are alive and reachable. Instead, we propose a new algorithm
Group SHIA (GSHIA) which includes two additional properties. First, nodes can
organize themselves into groups of size g, where g is arbitrarily defined by the BS.
This can be easily achieved as the ‘delay aggregation’ approach of SHIA develops
an aggregation tree one node at a time. Since the root node of the aggregation tree
knows the size of its subtree, it can declare a partition complete when it has g nodes
or it cannot add any more nodes to its partition.
In GSHIA, the BS can also verify the integrity of the aggregation process for
a group of unknown size and membership set. This property can be implemented
through the use of a Bloom filter [Blo70] that summarizes the membership infor-
mation of the partition. The BS then verifies the membership set by exhaustively
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searching through the possible nodes. The change we propose places most of the
membership resolution burden on the BS, which is generally assumed to be power-
ful. However we can reduce the computation burden by noting that Algorithm 1 is
nested (i.e., each new partition is a proper subset of an older impure partition) and
therefore the space of possible partitions in each round is reduced by a factor of m.
Further improvements can be made if the BS knows the topology of the network
a priori, using efficient schemes such as [SBD02]. For protocol details as well as
analysis and further improvement strategies, we refer the reader to [TG08].
An alternative approach to the above modification is to use the original SHIA
algorithm and make the additional assumption that the BS knows the topology of the
network prior to the detection period. The BS can then deterministically partition
the network for a given m and transmit this information to each sensor. When
an impure group is detected, nodes divide themselves according to the specified
partitioning. Although this method is simpler and more efficient, the additional
assumption is not always practical as sensor networks often have dynamic topologies
due to the short life span of the sensors.
Tests for Singleton Partitions. If a partition contains exactly one sensor node,
the node v transmits its measured data xv along with a MAC tag σv computed using
Kv. Upon receiving 〈v, xv, σv〉, the BS verifies the tag and ensures that xv is valid.




For the sake of brevity, we only describe the differences between SHIA and
GSHIA and we refer the reader to [CPS06] for details and analysis of SHIA. GSHIA
has four main phases: query dissemination, grouping, aggregation-commit and result
checking.
Query Dissemination. The request message the BS broadcasts also includes the
following grouping information: the size of the new partitions as well as the ID of
the groups that were found impure in the previous round.
Aggregation-Commit. Nodes within a group compute a cryptographic commit-
ment structure over their data values and the aggregation process as in SHIA. Also
to allow the resolution of the group memberships, each leaf vertex also computes a
Bloom filter that probabilistically summarizes the node membership set. The filter
is then forwarded to the parent internal vertex, who aggregates the filters using the
bit-wise or function. Additionally each leaf vertex computes an authentication tag
over a fixed message and forwards this to its parent node. The tags are aggregated
using the bit-wise xor function to form the group tag. The group filter and tag are
used by the BS to determine the group membership sets.
Grouping. In this phase, node grouping is conducted through the selection of leader
nodes for each group. This phase is executed in parallel with the aggregation-commit
phase. Whenever a node performs the aggregation and commitment operations, it
also determines if it is a group leader by comparing the group size with the target
size broadcast by BS in the request message. If a node is selected as group leader,
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then all the nodes in its subtree which do not as yet belong to a group become its
group members. The group leader then computes a message authentication code
(MAC) and forwards the group aggregates and commitments along with the MAC
to the BS without further aggregation along the way. If the node is not selected
a group leader, it simply forwards its aggregation and commitment values to its
parent node, where they are aggregated further. In this way, groups are iteratively
generated starting from the leaf nodes and approaching the BS or the root of the
network spanning tree. At the end of the aggregation-commit process, all remaining
nodes which do not belong to a group are grouped together with the BS acting as
their group leader.
Result Checking. At the end of the aggregation-commit and grouping phases, each
group leader has reported their aggregation results and commitment values to the
base station. The base station first determines the group size and the membership
set of each group. This is done by narrowing down the potential membership sets
of a group based on the location of the group leader, the group size and the group
Bloom filter. The correct membership set can be verified by the aggregated group
tag. Once the membership set of a group has been determined, the group size can
also be verified. The BS then authenticates the final commitment values of each
group and disseminated them to the respective groups.
The result checking is the distributed verification process as in SHIA, where
each group verification code is forwarded to the BS by the group leader. When the
BS receives all the group confirmation codes, it accepts the group aggregates if it
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can verify that all group members have individually verified the correctness of the
aggregation protocol. The BS discards any group aggregate which is not verified
by all group members and classifies the associated group as suspicious. The final
network aggregate is computed over all groups which are deemed correct.
3.4.2.1 Analysis
Communication Complexity. The aggregation verification process has a link
congestion of O(log2 n) where n is the size of the group [CPS06]. GSHIA intro-
duces the following additional messages in the query dissemination and aggregation-
commit phases of the scheme: (1) group IDs, (2) Bloom filter output and (3) group
tag. Messages (2) and (3) are fixed size and message (1) depends on the number
of active partitions in the network, m. Thus the final link congestion for GSHIA is
O(log2 n+m).
Security Analysis of Grouping. We must show that a malicious node cannot
force the BS accept a false grouping. A group membership set is summarized via
the Bloom filter. The BS can verify that the filter output has not been changed by
verifying the validity of the group tag, which is the xor of the MACs of the group
members. Assuming that the MAC scheme is secure, then a malicious node can
at best forge the group tag with negligible probability. Hence if the BS can verify
the group tag associated with the Bloom filter and ensuring that each node in the
network belongs to at most one group, it knows with overwhelming probability that
the grouping is correct.
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3.4.3 Computing Aggregate
An important feature of our algorithm is that the network aggregate can tol-
erate malicious nodes and in fact, the aggregate degrades gracefully with the attack.
In particular, dual to the intuition that the algorithm recursively isolates the cor-
rupted nodes, is that the algorithm also increasingly identifies the uncorrupted nodes
in the network. The BS can then use the data from the nodes determined to be
uncorrupted to reconstruct the network service.
Recall our assumption that the sensed environment of the network does not
change during the protocol execution. Thus we can improve the quality of the
network aggregate in each successive round by incorporating the aggregates of newly
found pure groups. Algorithm 3 shows how the aggregate is updated when the
aggregation function is sum. We can easily extend this to other low-order statistics
functions, such as min/max, averaging, etc.
Algorithm 3 Aggregate Update in Round i
Input: Aggregate Ψi−1 from round i − 1, set {Ψ[j]} of the aggregates of all pure
partitions from round i.




In the following, we first show the correctness of the proposed algorithm and
in Section 3.5, we propose a mathematical framework to analyze the communication
cost associated with providing our security solution.
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Theorem 3.4.1 Given an input set of nodes N and partition degree m, Algorithm
1 outputs two resulting sets of corrupt nodes M and of good nodes G, M ∪G = N .
• (Completeness) If corrupt node v ∈ N , then v ∈M , i.e. no false negatives.
• (Soundness) If node v ∈M , then v is corrupt, i.e. no false positives.
Proof: Let T be the identification tree that Algorithm 1 generates. For any
corrupted node v ∈ N , any vertex u in T which contains v, tests impure. This
is because a corrupted node is persistently malicious and the partition test t(·) is
perfect (i.e., the test result is always correct). Each impure vertex in T is either
divided into smaller partitions if it is a non-singleton set, or is added to the set M
if it is a singleton set. Since the algorithm converges when t = 0 or when there are
no more impure non-singleton partitions, then by convergence time the algorithm
must have found all corrupt nodes and added them to set M . Thus the algorithm
is complete.
Additionally, the algorithm is sound since if node v ∈ M , then there exists a
vertex u in identification tree T which is associated with a singleton set {v} and
that {v} is impure. Thus v must be malicious. 2
Corollary 3.4.1 Algorithm 1 isolates all c corrupt nodes within dlogm |N |e rounds.
We can trivially prove this as the leaf at the highest level of identication tree
T denes the round duration of the algorithm. In particular note that T is rooted at
a vertex associated with node set N and the root node (at level 1) is processed in
round 0. Also in each round, the active vertices are divided into m equal partitions
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and at most one of the partitions contains a smaller number of nodes. It is thus
easy to see that T has leaves on levels dlogm |N |e+ 1 and dlogm |N |e.
3.5 A Theoretical Model for Cost Analysis
In this section, we derive the cost associated with the security guarantees of
the proposed protocol. We first formulate the communication cost in terms of an
optimization problem. We then analytically solve this problem by introducing a
novel mathematical framework, inspired by [DH00, FT99] and evaluate our results
using an example network of 4096 nodes. For a complete analysis of the problem,
finally we look at the best and average case cost of the system.
The link cost of the algorithm is a function of the number of partitions that
are generated in each round (referred to as partition cost) as well as the aggregation-
verification cost of each partition (referred to as the test cost of each partition). It
is important to distinguish between the two costs because partition cost is charac-
terized solely by the identification algorithm, whereas test cost is a function of the
aggregation-verification primitive adopted and can be improved upon. We empha-
size that the total cost derived in this section are based on the use of GSHIA as our
primitive.
3.5.1 Cost Upper Bound Definition
Let N be a network instance with c corrupted nodes, N ∈ Nc, input to the
algorithm and let the algorithm terminate in τ = dlogm |N |e rounds. Let P (i,m,N)
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denote the number of partitions in round i where each partition is of size T (j,m,N),








Worst case cost of the algorithm is the maximum cost of the algorithm for all
distributions of c corrupt nodes in the network:
G(m, c) = max
N∈Nc
C(m,N, c) (3.2)




The parameters which achieve G(c) are called the minimax parameters of the iden-
tification algorithm. The goal of the network administrator is to find the minimax
parameter m for a given network N without knowing the number of corrupt nodes
c.
The primary parameter in Equation 3.3 is partition degree m. Towards solving
Equation 3.3 we consider the effect of m on the different components of cost. Test
cost for singleton and non-singleton groups are O(1) and O(log g) (refer to Appendix
A) respectively, where g is the size of the group. Thus test cost is logarithmically
related to 1/m.
In the following, we present some results relating m with partition cost. This
is of particular interest as our results can be applied to other divide-and-conquer
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algorithms. In fact the isolated problem of optimizing partition cost is equivalent to
an instance of combinatorial group testing problem, where the number of defectives
is unknown and we optimize the algorithm to minimize the number of tests per-
formed. Inspired by group testing results for m = 2 [DH93], we extend the results
for the general m-ary case. To the best of our knowledge this is the first time the
m-ary case has been considered.
3.5.2 Results
3.5.2.1 Upper bound when n is a power of m
We first prove the upper bound of the partition cost for different m-ary iden-
tification algorithms, where the number of nodes in the network n is a power of m
and then compute the upper bound of the total cost of the identification scheme
when n is a power of m.
Theorem 3.5.1 Let n be a power of m > 1. Then for c corrupted nodes in n







Proof: Let T be the m-ary identification tree whose root vertex is associated with
a set of size n, which is a power of m. According to the algorithm, every internal
vertex must be associated with an impure set and there must exist exactly c impure
leaves. We sum up the total number of pure leaves in T as follows. Let u denote
the height of tree T , u = logm n. Each level i has m
i−1 vertices, where at most
c are impure. Level v = dlog ce is the first level with at least c vertices and let
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mi−1 + c(u− v + 1)
=
(1−mv)
















since 0 ≤ w < 1 and f(w) = −w − mw
1−m is a convex function. For 0 ≤ w ≤ 1,
f(w) is maximized at w = 0, 1, where f(0) = f(1) = 1
m−1 . Thus there are at most





m−1) impure internal nodes in T . Each internal node has






Theorem 3.5.2 Let n be a power of m > 1. Then for c corrupted nodes in the n
nodes, 1 ≤ c ≤ n/m, the total cost G(m,n, c) of the identification algorithm is upper
bounded by
∑u





+ 1) if i < v
mc (log n
mi−1
+ 1), if i ≥ v
(3.4)
where v = dlogm ce and log denotes log2.
Proof: Let tree T be the m-ary identification tree whose root vertex is associated
with a set of size n. Let sequence element H[i] represent the total cost of the
identification algorithm in level i of the identification tree T . Each level i of T has
mi−1 vertices, where at most c are impure. Also each vertex at level i has exactly
n
mi−1
nodes. Level v of T is the first level where T has at least c vertices. Therefore
at level i < v, all mi−1 vertices are impure. Since each test has a cost of at most
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(log p+m), where p is the number of nodes tested, the total cost of each level i < v
is upper bounded by mi−1(log n
mi−1
+m). Now consider level i ≥ v. Then each level
has at most mc impure nodes of size mi−1. Therefore total cost of each level i ≥ v
is upper bounded by mc(log n
mi−1
+m). 2
3.5.2.2 Upper bound when n is not a power of m
In the general case when n is not a power of m, we cannot use the approach of
[DH93] (solved for m = 2) as the number of possible ways the corrupted nodes are
distributed within each subtree explodes (analogous to the combinatorial, ball in the
bucket problem). Instead we propose a novel model, inspired by the work of Fiat
and Tassa [FT99] in the context of dynamic traitor tracing (DTT)1. We introduce
the notion of a path trace, defined with respect to a particular corrupted node. The
path trace traces the identification path of that node in the identification tree T .
Informally we say a path trace D for corrupted node u is rooted at the vertex v in
tree T that the identification algorithm separates it from the other corrupted nodes
in the network. The trace includes all the vertices in the path between v and the
leaf vertex associated with set {u}. Therefore each time an impure vertex v′ in T
has more than one impure child, then the algorithm learns that the node set at v′
contained more than one corrupted node, and thus a new tree trace D′ is generated.
Fig. 3.2 shows the paths generated for an example identification tree. Note that
although a path trace is not unique to a given node, the set of path traces generated































Figure 3.2: Path traces for corrupted nodes 5, 8, 13 and 14.
is unique. We can therefore determine the set of path traces in a network without
associating them to a particular corrupted node.
Lemma 3.5.1 A path trace of length ` generates m` partitions where there are m
partitions of sizes {m`−i}, i = 1, · · · , `.
Proof: The path trace is a path on an m-ary tree and each internal vertex on the
path has (m − 1) other siblings that are also tested. Also a path trace of length `
has a root vertex associated with m` nodes. Thus at level i of the path, the vertex
is associated with m`−i nodes. 2
Consider identification tree T generated by Algorithm 1, for n nodes.
Lemma 3.5.2 Let n = mh where h ∈ Z+. Then define sequence P as:
P = {h, {h− 1}m−1, {h− 2}m(m−1), {h− 3}m2(m−1), · · · } (3.5)
where {y}x denotes the value y repeated x times. The first c elements in P represent
the tight upper bound on the length of the path traces generated when n contains c
corrupted nodes.
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Proof: Since n contains at least one corrupted node, the first path trace D1 is
rooted at the root of T and thus has length h. A new path trace is generated any
time a vertex in T contains more than one impure child. To find the upper bound
on the length of the path traces, each trace should be generated in as early a round
as possible. On level 2 of T (round 1), up to (m− 1) path traces can be generated
of length (h− 1); at level 3, up to m(m− 1) path traces can be generated of length
(h − 2), and so on. In general, in level i, up to mi(m − 1) path traces of length
(logm n − (i − 1)) can be generated. Since one path trace is associated with each
corrupted node and there are c corrupted nodes, the set of lengths associated with
the generated path traces can be represented by the first c elements of P . 2
Theorem 3.5.3 Let mh−1 < n < mh where h ∈ Z+. Then define sequence P ′ as:
P ′[i] =

P [i] if i < x
P [i]− 1 if (i > x & P [i] > 0)
0 otherwise
(3.6)






The first c elements in P ′ represent the tight upper bound on the length of the
path traces generated when n contains c corrupted nodes.
Proof: It is trivial to show that the number of internal nodes at level h − 1 is
defined by x. Then there are (mh−1 − x) leaves in level (h − 1) and (n −mh−1 +
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x) leaves in level h. To find the upper bound of the lengths of the path traces,
min(x, c) of the path traces are associated with a corrupted node at level (h +
1) and thus they correspond to the identification tree for mh nodes. The path
traces corresponding to the remaining corrupted nodes have leaves at level h and
correspond to a identification tree for mh−1 nodes. 2
We can use Theorem 3.5.3 to derive the tight upper bound on the total cost of
the identification algorithm. Consider identification tree T generated by algorithm 2,
for a network of n nodes. Let T contain α complete m-ary trees and one incomplete
m-ary tree, with respective depths d1, · · · , dα+1. Let P1, · · · , Pα+1 correspond to the
set of potential path traces for each of the (α+1) respective subtrees using Lemmas
3.5.1 and 3.5.2. Then let sequence P be composed of the non-increasing ordered
set of the path traces {Pi, · · · , Pα+1}, i.e. P = {h, (h − 1)a1 , (h − 2)a2 , · · · }, where
a1, a2, · · · are dependent on the size of the subtrees. If n contains c corrupted nodes,
then the length of the generated path traces are bounded by the first c elements in
P . We can use Lemma 3.5.1 and sequence P to compute the size and number of
the partitions that Algorithm 2 generates in the worst case and derive total cost by
summing the cost of the c path traces.
Finally we derive a closed form expression for the loose upper bound on the
total cost of the network. This is purely for the purposes of comparison of our work
with existing solutions.
Theorem 3.5.4 For c corrupted nodes in a network of size n, the identification
algorithm has a communication link cost of O(c2 log3 n).
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Proof: Consider the detection tree corresponding to the identification algorithm,
which is of height log n (Theorem 3.4.1). Then for the worst distribution of compro-
mised nodes in the network, there exists at most mc partitions in each level. Since
























= mc(log2 n− logm log n
2
(log n+ 1) = O(c log2 n)
Since according to Theorem 3.5.1 partition cost of n nodes is O(c log n), then
total cost is bounded by O(c2 log3 n). 2
3.5.3 A Numerical Example
To gain a better intuition of the results, we compute the cost associated with
handling an adversary attack in a network of 4096 nodes (where c nodes are compro-
mised) and analyze the graceful degradation of the network service. For test cost,
we use the cost derived by [CPS06] as the more efficient bound of [FD08] is not a
fixed cost characteristic.
Fig. 3.3(a) and 3.3(b) graph the maximum partition cost and total cost of the
m-ary identification scheme, for different m. The baseline scheme is used in the
graphs as a lower bound for when the proposed identification scheme is effective
and efficient. Fig. 3.3(a) verifies the intuition that for a fixed number of corrupted
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Figure 3.3: Cost of the identification scheme, as a function of partition degree.
nodes in the network c, the number of generated partitions increases with the par-
tition degree m. This increase plateaus when the the identification scheme needs
to test every single vertex on the identification tree. The performance of the m-ary
identification scheme is best shown in Fig. 3.3(b) where the link cost for different
m is compared with the baseline. It is clear that to optimize total cost, a network
administrator choose an appropriate partition degree depending on probability of
attack, vulnerability of the network as well as the necessary rapidity of the response
(as response time is O(logm n)). Fig. 3.3(b) also shows that test cost is the dominant
term in total cost. This is promising as test cost is only dependent on the cost of
the aggregation-verification primitive. More efficient primitives yield better results.
Fig. 3.4(b) and 3.4(b) shows the rate of improvement of the network service
over the course of identification. Data is normalized by only looking at the number
of nodes that contribute to the aggregate in a particular round. The maximum
available data for a network of size n with c corrupted nodes, is n− c. In particular
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Figure 3.4: Aggregate availability, as a function of partition degree m.
we note that if we fix c, as m is reduced, data becomes available in later rounds.
This is because in the worst case, the first c partitions generated are corrupt.
3.5.4 Lower Bound and Average of Partition Cost
Up to now, we have focused on the upper bound or worst case partition cost.
To gain an understanding for the behavior of the algorithm in practice, it is impor-
tant to also analyze the lower bound and average behavior of the partition cost.
3.5.4.1 Average Cost
Computing the average partition cost when the number of malicious nodes in
the network is fixed leads to a state space size exponential in the number of nodes in
the network. To see this, observe that the number of possible states in each round is
equivalent to the classic combinatorial balls-in-the-buckets problem where the balls
and the buckets correspond to the nodes and partitions in the network respectively;
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furthermore there are two types of balls (good nodes and bad nodes). Then the total
number of possible states can be computed by the product of the number of states
in each round. This leads to a combinatorial explosion in the number of states and
therefore is hard to compute exactly.
3.5.4.2 Lower Bound Cost
The lower bound of the partition cost can be obtained by minimizing the
number of vertices in the detection tree T . According to the algorithm, every internal
vertex of T must be associated with an impure set and there must exist exactly c
impure leaves. Partition cost can be minimized when both the number of pure leaves
and the internal vertices in T are minimized. Figure 3.5 presents two different
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(b) Minimum partition cost (c) Maximum partition cost(a) Original Detection tree
impure
pure
Figure 3.5: Partition cost depends on how the compromised nodes are distributed
in the network.
Figure 3.6(a) graphs the lower and upper bounds of the partition cost of the
identification algorithm in a network of 1024 nodes for different number of com-
promised nodes. As expected this results in much smaller cost than the worst case
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scenario and the cost increase is almost linear in the number of compromised nodes
in the network. Indeed the intersection of the detection partition cost and the cost
of the trivial scheme changes from 128 compromised nodes to 512. This means that
the partition cost of the detection scheme is less than the total cost of the trivial
scheme for up to 512 compromised nodes. Figure 3.6(b) presents the lower and
upper bounds of the total cost of the identification algorithm. In the best case, the
performance of the identification algorithm is better than the trivial case even up
to 96 compromised nodes. However in the worst case, the scheme performs worst
than trivial scheme when simply 3 nodes are compromised.









































Figure 3.6: Bounding (a) partition cost and (b) total cost for binary identification
algorithm.
3.5.5 Rational Adversary: Bounded Presence
We have clearly shown that the cost of the detection scheme is directly related
to the distribution of the compromised nodes on the aggregation tree. Detection
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cost increases as nodes are more uniformly distributed along the aggregation tree.
In particular, detection cost is maximized when the c compromised nodes are dis-
tributed such that they generate c disjoint subsets in as early a round as possible2.
In contrast, cost is minimized when the compromised nodes are distributed so that
they form a contiguous cluster and therefore generate the c disjoint subsets in as
late a round as possible.
The intuition is evident as follows. Let nodes be identified according to their
geographical locations on a one dimensional axis, such that nodes u1 is neighbor to
u2, which is in turn neighbor to u3 and so on. Cost is minimized when an adversary
compromises a contiguous cluster of nodes u1, · · · , uc. Of course not every clustering
of nodes results in optimal cost since a cluster can span multiple detection subtrees.
For example in Figure 3.5 cost of detection would be distinctly different if instead of
compromising nodes u1, u2, u3, which results in minimum partition cost, the cluster
of nodes u7, u8, u9 were compromised. Therefore, although compromising a cluster
of nodes does not always result in minimum cost, it does save significant cost.
The above observation is indeed promising as a rational adversary compro-
mises nodes that minimize its cost and maximize its benefit. It is rational behavior
for an adversary to compromise a cluster of neighboring nodes (i.e., have a bounded
presence) than to uniformly compromise nodes across the whole network. Com-
promising uniformly requires not only a greater deal of network access, but also
increased risk of physical detection. We can therefore conclude that in the event of
an attack, it is more likely for the detection cost to be closer to the lower bound
2This round number corresponds to the value of parameter v in Theorem 3.5.2.
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(best case) than the upper bound (worst case).
3.6 Conclusion
Adversary attacks against data aggregation in ad hoc networks can have disas-
trous results, whereby a single corrupted node can affect the perceived measurements
of large portions of the network by the BS. Current approaches to handling such
attacks either aim exclusively at the detection of attack or provide inefficient ways of
identifying corrupted nodes in the network, with respect to the baseline scheme; i.e.,
it is more efficient if sensor data is not aggregated at all. In this work, we presented
a group-based approach to handling adversary attacks in aggregation applications,
that identifies corrupted nodes while ensuring continuous, but gracefully degraded
service during the attack period. Our analysis results in a precise cost-base charac-
terization of when in-network aggregation retains its assumed benefits in a sensor
network operating under persistent attacks. Our scheme is most effective when the
adversary has corrupted a small fraction of the nodes in the network.
Although our work provides promising results in divide-and-conquer handling
of attacks in aggregation applications, we have assumed a simplified adversary
model. In the future, we plan on generalizing our model to account for non-persistent




Privacy-preserving Integrity-assured Data Aggregation
4.1 Single Aggregator Model
We consider the setting where n sensors are deployed in some area, remotely
from a user U . Sensors monitor and measure their environments and respond to
the statistical queries of the user. An aggregator node A is used as an intermediary
between the user and the sensor nodes that aggregates the sensor data and forwards
the query response to the user. The aggregator can be thought of as a third party
that computes an aggregation function f on the input sensor data x1, . . . , xn where
xi is the measurement of sensor si. The aggregator forwards the aggregate y =
f(x1, · · · , xn) to the user U .
We assume that all nodes have direct access to the aggregator node. All mes-
sages exchanged between the sensor nodes and the user, pass through the aggregator.
4.2 Privacy
Privacy in the single aggregator model can be preserved with respect to either
an untrusted external user, aggregator or mutually distrustful sensor nodes. Privacy
issues can range from individual measurements and transactional privacy to node







y = f(x1, · · · , xn)
Figure 4.1: Single aggregator model
on preserving the privacy of measured data with respect to the user. Henceforth,
our use of the term ‘privacy’ implicitly implies ‘data sensed by individual nodes’.
A spectrum of privacy goals can be defined based on the controlled disclosure
of private data. This controlled revelation may become an acceptable trade-off given
the different efficiency and confidence requirements of a system as well as different
aggregation function to be computed.
In this work, we define two distinct privacy goals. Perfect privacy is achieved
when the adversary does not obtain any information about {xi} other than what it
can deduce from the aggregate.
Distribution privacy is achieved when the adversary does not learn any
information about the distribution of the data {xi}, other than what it can deduce
from the aggregate.
For clarity of definition, consider a sensor network where the environment to
be sensed follows a probability distribution function h(x). Let xi be the sensed data
of sensor si. To achieve perfect privacy, other than what user U can learn from the
aggregate, U should not learn xi; to achieve distribution privacy, U should not learn
h.
Distribution privacy allows the protection of sensed data against attacks such
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C = Confidentiality
P = Data Privacy
C P
Figure 4.2: Relationship between confidentiality and data privacy
as tight estimation attack [AKSX04], where the aim of the adversary is to success-
fully determine a tight estimation of a secret plaintext, given its ciphertext. The
tight estimation attack is clearly a relaxation of the security requirements of the
ciphertext only attack (COA), where the aim of the adversary is to determine any
information about a challenged ciphertext.
4.2.1 Privacy vs. Confidentiality.
In the context of aggregation applications, data confidentiality and data pri-
vacy, although related, are two distinct notions; viz., Figure 4.2. Privacy addresses
not just data confidentiality but also hides any other information that can be re-
vealed about the data, such as its distribution or various statistics. In contrast,
confidentiality only deals with achieving perfect hiding of the data items and there-
fore can be considered to be a building block used to preserve privacy.
4.3 PIA Security Models
PIA deals with two distinct problems: privacy-preservation and aggregation
integrity-assurance. Each problem is from the viewpoint of a different entity in the
system and therefore has a separate adversary model and associated security goal
that must be achieved.
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4.3.1 Integrity-Verification
In the aggregation integrity-assured model, the user U wishes to verify the
integrity of the aggregation process performed by an untrusted aggregator A.
Assume a polynomially bounded integrity-adversary that can corrupt the ag-
gregator node A. The integrity-adversary can completely control the actions of A
and learn any information residing on it.1 The integrity-adversary’s goal is to make
the user accept a false aggregation result in a stealthy manner; i.e., not be detected
by the user. The security goal of the user is to prevent stealthy attacks and ensure
that the reported aggregate y′ is “close enough” to the true aggregation value y—the
accuracy of the aggregate depends on the verification efficiency we want to achieve.
Definition 4.3.1 An aggregation scheme is perfectly secure if the adversary is un-
able to induce the user to accept an incorrect aggregation result.
This definition is a stricter than the security definition provided by Chan et
al. [CPS06] as in our scenario, sensors are trusted. Chan et al.’s definition accounts
for untrusted sensors by allowing the presence of direct injection attacks—a direct
data injection attack occurs when a malicious sensor node modifies the measured
data it reports.
Approximation security was proposed by Pryzdatek et al. [PSP03]:
1In a more general model, the adversary can also corrupt a fraction of the sensors in the network
and falsify the measurement value they report. Detection of such misbehavior however requires
prior knowledge of the data distribution or applications/semantic specific knowledge. In this work,
we don’t address this type of attack since we do not make any assumptions on prior knowledge
information.
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Definition 4.3.2 An aggregation scheme is (ε, δ)-approximation secure if the re-
ported aggregate y′ is bound by (1 − ε)y ≤ y′ ≤ (1 + ε)y and the probability that a
malicious aggregator is not detected is upper bounded by δ.
4.3.2 Privacy Preservation
In the privacy-preserving model, sensor nodes wish to preserve the privacy of
their information with respect to the untrusted external user U .
Assume a polynomially bounded privacy-preserving adversary that can corrupt
user U . The privacy-adversary can completely control the actions of the user and
learn any information residing on it. Similar to the integrity-adversary, we do not
bound the actions of the privacy-adversary, but limit the computational power and
time of the privacy-adversary (polynomial in the security parameter). The goal of
the attacker is to learn more about the measured data {xi} of the sensors {si} than
what is specified by the privacy goal.
Definition 4.3.3 An aggregation scheme is private if U does not learn any infor-
mation about the measured data {xi} defined by the privacy goal, other than what it
can deduce from the aggregate y.
4.4 Aggregation Functions
We define the following categories of aggregation functions: decomposable and
comparison-based.
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A decomposable function f(x1, . . . , xn) can be expressed as:
f(x1, · · · , xn) = φ(g1(x1, · · · , xn), · · · , gm(x1, · · · , xn))
where φ, g1, . . . , gm are some other functions. We say f is decomposed into functions
g1, . . . , gm. Such functions are intrinsically hierarchical.
A comparison-based function f(x1, · · · , xn) can be computed by an algorithm
which only uses the comparison operations greater-than and less-than. Quantile
functions are instances of comparison-based functions.
4.5 PIA Solution 1
In the first PIA solution, we show how perfect data privacy can be achieved
for a general class of functions in the centralized integrity verification model. Our
solution uses homomorphic encryption to hide the data.
An encryption scheme E is homomorphic if it allows meaningful manipulation
of ciphertexts; i.e., by performing a specific algebraic operation  on the ciphertext,
one can perform operation ⊗ on the plaintext; i.e., E(x1) E(x2) = E(x1 ⊗ x2).
Such capability seems a natural fit for data aggregation as it allows an aggre-
gator to operate on encrypted data. Depending on the desired aggregation function,
an appropriate homomorphic encryption scheme can be selected.
Existing schemes e.g., [CMT05] however, are not resilient against adversaries
that attack the integrity of the data as homomorphic encryptions are malleable by
design. Our proposed scheme combines homomorphism and message authentication
codes (MAC) to construct an authenticated encryption scheme for the aggregator
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model. Note that to obtain a secure authenticated encryption scheme, the order in
which the two primitives are composed is crucial.
In the following, we consider the sum aggregation function, which allows the
computation of additive functions such as mean and standard deviation. This re-
quires an encryption scheme which is homomorphic over the addition operation.
This approach can be easily extended to other homomorphic operations, such as
multiplication.
4.5.1 Assumptions.
Let (Ke, E ,D) be a perfectly private, symmetric-key additively homomorphic
encryption scheme where Ke is the key generation algorithm, Ek(·) is the encryption
algorithm using key k and Dk(·) is the decryption algorithm using k. An example
scheme is proposed by Castelluccia et al. [CMT05]
We also assume the existence of a MAC protocol (Km,M,V) secure against
existential forgeries in a chosen message attack, where Km is the key generation
algorithm, Mk(·) is the tag generation algorithm using key k and Vk(·) is the tag
verification algorithm using k. An example instance of a secure MAC protocol is
the HMAC [BCK96].
4.5.2 Protocol Description.
In the setup phase, a trusted third party generates and distributes an en-
cryption key kei and a MAC key k
m
i to each sensor node si. The user is given the
63
User
(keU , {kmi }i=1···n)
!xi, ci, !i"
Sensor
si(xi, kmi , kei )
Aggregator
ci = Ekei (xi)
!i =Mkmi (ci)
y = f(x1, ..., xn)
! = ⊕!i
c̃ = c1 + ... + ci
Verify y = DkeU (c̃)
Verify ! = !Mkmi (ci)
!{ci}ni=1, !, y"
Figure 4.3: PIA Solution 1
encryption master key keU =
∑n
i=1 ki and also MAC keys k
m
i for i = 1, . . . , n. Note
that the user cannot deduce any information about the individual sensor encryption
keys using keU .
Sensor si encrypts its data xi and computes a MAC tag σi over ci and forwards
them to the aggregator. The aggregator computes the data aggregate y and the
MAC aggregate using the xor function and forwards 〈{ci}ni=1, σ, y〉 to user. The
user verifies the correctness of the alleged aggregate y by decrypting the sum of the
ciphertexts {ci}ni=1 using keU . If the aggregate verifies, it verifies the aggregate MAC
tag to ensure the aggregator has not changed the data ciphertexts.
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4.5.3 Analysis
Theorem 4.5.1 PIA solution 1 is perfectly private.
Given that the encryption scheme is perfectly private, the user cannot learn
any information about raw data xi from the individual ciphertexts ci, except what
is revealed by the aggregate, which in this case is simply the sum of the ciphertexts.
Next we show security of the system against the integrity-adversary. Intu-
itively, the scheme is secure because the composition of a perfectly private encryption
scheme and an existentially unforgeable MAC scheme results in an authenticated
encryption scheme which is INT-PTXT (“integrity of plaintext”) secure.
Theorem 4.5.2 PIA solution 1 is perfectly secure.
Proof: We need to show that an integrity-adversary cannot induce the user U
to accept an incorrect aggregation result y′ such that y′ 6= ∑ni=0 xi. According to
the protocol, U accepts y′ if first, ciphertext c̃ = ∑ni=1 ci decrypts to y′ and second,
the aggregate tag σ verifies correctly. Since semantic security of the encryption
scheme is only intended against a passive adversary, the integrity-adversary has the
capability of modifying ciphertext ci without being detected. However the integrity-
adversary can induce U to accept the second test if and only if it can forge a valid
MAC tag for ci. Assuming that the MAC protocol is existentially unforgeable, then
the integrity-adversary can succeed at best, with negligible probability. 2
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4.5.4 Discussion
Although a homomorphic based scheme is perfectly private, the approach lim-
its the aggregation functions that can be supported—in particular, only functions
that the encryption scheme is homomorphic over are supported. An additive homo-
morphic scheme supports functions such as add, average and standard deviation. All
other functions are not supported, including the large set of comparison-based func-
tions, such as min/max or median. This is because an encryption scheme which is
perfectly secure or COA-secure cannot be homomorphic over a comparison function
[RAD78] as the adversary can learn information about the order of the ciphertexts
and thus break the scheme.
An indirect effect of the scheme’s inability to support comparison operators is
that a range bound cannot be placed on the measured data, in order to bound the
effect of malicious sensors.
Finally, the scheme is highly efficient given the resource constrained sensor
nodes. In fact, each sensor sends the aggregator three values. The bulk of the
communication O(n), is between the aggregator and the user, which generally have
improved resources. However for large n, the scheme can still be inefficient.
4.6 PIA Solution 2
PIA Solution 1 shows that perfect privacy can be achieved in the centralized
integrity verification model but at the expense of limiting the aggregation functions
that are supported.
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In PIA Solution 2, we show a tradeoff between measure of privacy and the type
of aggregation function that the integrity verification can support. In particular, we
show how, in the centralized integrity verification model, we can support comparison
operator and quantile functions. The k-quantile of a data set is the point at which
k fraction of the values in the set are below a given point. For instance, the 0.5-
quantile (also called the median) is the point at which 50% of the data fall below.
Quantiles functions are especially useful in adversarial environments where
the attacker can compromise sensor nodes and transmit false data values. Detection
of such attacks, without prior knowledge of the data distribution, is very hard.
Recently, Wagner [Wag04] showed that the median of a data set is more resilient
in adversarial environments than the mean because unlike the mean, an adversary
cannot freely dictate the median of the data set.
Recall from Section 4.5 that any perfectly private encryption scheme used to
hide the data from the user excludes the support of comparison-based aggregation
functions, such as the quantile function. However we observe that by relaxing our
notion of privacy we can support comparison-based aggregation functions. In par-
ticular, by adopting an order preserving encryption scheme (OPES) we can preserve
the privacy of the distribution of the data—OPES preserves the order of the data;
i.e., any pair of plaintexts x1, x2, where x1 < x2, encrypt to ciphertexts c1, c2, such
that c1 < c2.
PIA Solution 2 uses an OPES scheme to verify the integrity of comparison-
based aggregation functions. The scheme, shown in Figure 4.4, works in three stages:
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Decrypt cagg
Find aggregate cagg of {c}
Commit to {c} as cmt
!cagg, cmt"
Verify cagg
Encrypt ci = EK(xi)
      !ci"






Figure 4.4: Overview of PIA Solution 2
1. Encrypt: Sensors encrypt their data using an OPES with a master secret
key shared by all the nodes in the network. The encrypted data set C is sent to the
aggregator.
2. Aggregation-Verification: The aggregator determines the aggregate
cagg of the encrypted data set C and engages the user in a protocol, to verify the
correctness of the alleged encrypted aggregate cagg.
3. Decrypt: The user queries the sensors to decrypt cagg and find the plain-
text of the data aggregate.
4.6.1 Protocol Description
4.6.1.1 Encryption
We need an encryption scheme which takes as input a target distribution and
transform the plaintext values in such a way that the transformation preserves the







Stage 2: Flatten Stage 3: Transform
Figure 4.5: Bucket distribution transformation in OPES
adversary can have access to all ciphertext values and does not have any other
information, including any special information about the domain of the plaintext
data. This closely corresponds to the scenario of a remotely deployed sensor network
and a user querying the sensed data.
We use the OPES scheme of Agrawal et al. [AKSX04] proposed originally for
database encryption. The scheme only uses addition and multiplication operations
and has been shown to be practical for MICA2 motes [AGW05].
OPES works in three stages. We briefly outline each stage below and refer the
reader to [AKSX04] for the details.
1. Model. Distinct data values from both the input and the target distribu-
tions are first partitioned into buckets that capture the statistical information about
the distributions. The distribution in each bucket is then modeled as a linear spline,
where the spline for a bucket [xl, xh) is simply the line connecting the densities at
the two end points of the bucket.
2. Flatten. The plaintext data set X is transformed into a flat data set F
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such that the values in F are uniformly distributed.
3. Transform The flat database F is transformed into the cipher data set
C such that the values in C are distributed according the target distribution. The
target distribution is chosen so that the adversary is forced to make large estimation
errors.
For further details of OPES, we refer the reader to [AKSX04].
4.6.1.2 Aggregation-Verification
Once the data is encrypted and forwarded to the aggregator A who aggregates
the data, the user U initiates an aggregate integrity verification algorithm. There
are two approaches to verify the integrity of an alleged aggregate y, differing in the
verification accuracy that they provide.
If a user desires perfect verification (e.g., in [DDHV03]), then the user requires
access to all the raw sensor data x1, · · · , xn in order to recompute and check if
y
?
= f(x1, · · · , xn). In this case the aggregation integrity verification algorithm
is straightforward: the aggregator simply forwards the user an alleged ciphertext
aggregate cagg and the complete set of data ciphertexts c1, . . . , cn. The user can thus
verify the correctness of cagg for any comparison-based aggregation function using the
individual data ciphertexts. However, in some scenarios, the high communication
overhead between the aggregator A and the user U (linear in the number of sensors
in the network) might not be desirable. This is in particular the case, if the network
is large.
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To reduce the communication between A and U , Przydatek et al. [PSP03]
propose an aggregate-commit-prove framework where a user samples a subset of the
raw data and computes an approximation of the aggregate to ensure that the alleged
aggregate is “close enough” to the approximation. This framework can be used to
verify any function that can be approximated by uniform sampling of data.
For our purposes however, we use the set of aggregation-verification schemes
(called SIA) of Przydatek et al. [PSP03] as they improve the proof efficiency of
functions such as quantile, median and min/max. SIA offers a tradeoff between the
accuracy of the approximation and the communication cost between A and U . We
refer the reader to [PSP03] for the details. In the following, we briefly describe the
framework, with special attention to the median function.
Upon receiving the encrypted data ci from each sensor si over an authenticated
channel, A first computes the aggregate and then forms a commitment over the
collected data using a Merkle hash tree. This forces A to choose a fixed set of data
values. The aggregator then forwards the aggregate and the commitment to U .
The user then engages the aggregator in a proof protocol where it verifies that A
has used the data provided by the sensors and that the aggregate provided is close
enough to the true aggregate.
As an example, we describe the interactive proof U initiates with A to be
assured of the integrity of an alleged median value. Let A and U communicate over
authenticated channels.
Algorithm 4 MedianCheck [PSP03]
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Input: network size n, alleged aggregate y, commitment h, ε-approximation accu-
racy
1. U verifies that the committed sequence is sorted and that all the elements in
the sequence are distinct. This is done by selecting two elements xi, xj from random
positions in S and ensuring that xi < xj if i < j.
2. U verifies that y is (close to) the median of the committed sequence. Here,
the user selects elements from random positions in the committed sequence and en-
sures that the elements picked from the first and second half of the sequence are
respectively smaller and bigger than y.
Output: If both tests are valid, Accept.
Else, with probability at least (1− 1/e) > 1/2, Reject.
4.6.1.3 Decryption
Up to now, the user has verified the correctness of the encrypted aggregate c
alleged by the aggregator. If c is incorrect, the user terminates the protocol; else if c
is correct, the user decrypts the value by querying the appropriate sensor to obtain
the corresponding aggregate plaintext.
4.6.2 Analysis
Theorem 4.6.1 PIA Solution 2 achieves distribution privacy.
Proof: In addition to the aggregate value, user U sees only encrypted data. U
obtains a set of ciphertext values during the aggregate-verification stage. How-
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ever, since U does not have access to the decryption secret key and the original
OPES scheme perfectly hides the distribution of the sensor data (for proof refer
to [AKSX04]), then U cannot learn any information about the distribution of the
original data. 2
Theorem 4.6.2 In PIA Solution 2, the user can verify that the alleged aggregate
is the ε-approximation of the median with probability at least 1− 1/e, by requesting
O(log n/ε) elements from the aggregator.
Proof: Once the sensor nodes submit their encrypted data to the aggregator A
and A commits to the data by constructing a Merkle hash tree, the aggregator
cannot later change the ciphertext values. This is because of the collision-resistant
property of the hash function used in the Merkle hash tree. We use Theorem 2
from [PSP03] to prove that the user can verify with said probability that the alleged
ciphertext median is ε-approximation of the median of the ciphertext data set C.
This is because the encryption scheme preserves the order of the data. Once this is
verified, U queries the appropriate sensor to decrypt their ciphertext. Since sensor
nodes are honest, U obtains the valid median plaintext. 2
Lemma 4.6.1 PIA Solution 2 supports comparison-based aggregation functions and
requires O(1) communication per sensor.
Although we described the integrity verification scheme for the median func-
tion, we can easily extend the scheme for k-quantile type functions by changing
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the k-separating of the committed sequence. In general, this framework is use-
ful for any aggregation function which can be approximated by uniform sampling
[PSP03, BYKS01] and which relies only on the comparison operation.
4.7 PIA Solution 3
Next we focus on the distributed integrity verification model (refer to Fig-
ure 4.6) and show how we can achieve perfect privacy and integrity assurance. Recall
that this model transfers the recomputation of the aggregate to the sensor nodes.
Consequently, the solution is intrinsically privacy preserving as the user never needs
to access the raw data; i.e., the solution is private without requiring any additional
privacy preserving mechanisms such as encryption. However as we will show, this
privacy comes at the expense of increases communication between the sensor nodes
and depending on the application, this communication might neither be desired or
even feasible.
The distributed integrity verification approach was first proposed by Chan et
al. [CPS06] for in-network aggregation. In their proposed Secure Hierarchical In-
network Aggregation (SHIA) scheme, a commitment is constructed over the aggre-
gation process, forcing the integrity-adversary to choose a fixed aggregation topology
and set of aggregation results. Once the aggregation process is complete, each sen-
sor independently reconstructs the commitment tree and ensures that the adversary





User verifies y by 
recomputing f(x1,...,xn)





Each sensor verifies y by
recomputing f(x1,...,xn)
If all sensors agree, then 
user accepts y 
Figure 4.6: The difference between centralized and distributed aggregation integrity
verification models.
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If                       agree on alleged 
aggregate y, then U accepts y.
s1, s2, s3, s4
x1, x2, x3, x4
f(x1, x2, x3, x4)
Figure 4.7: PIA Solution 3: Basic distributed integrity verification, where xi is the
data of sensor si
4.7.1 Basic PIA Solution 3.1
We adapt distributed integrity verification from the in-network aggregation
model to the single aggregator model. We refer to the direct adaptation of SHIA as
the basic solution, as seen in Figure 6.
Algorithm 5 Basic PIA Solution 3.1
Let ki be a MAC key shared between si and U . Let H denote a secure cryptographic
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hash function.
1. A computes h = H(y, s1, x1, . . . , sn, xn) and sends 〈y, h〉 to U , where y is
the alleged aggregate.
2. U sends an authenticated broadcast 〈h〉 to all sensors si.
3. si gets from A pairs (sj, xj), ∀j 6= i. si computes aggregation function
y′ = f(x1, . . . , xn) and commitment hi using the data pairs. If hi = h, then si sends
ci = H(ki, OK) to U .
4. If U verifies that all sensors si agree with the value h, then the alleged
aggregate y is correct.
Theorem 4.7.1 Basic PIA Solution 3.1 is perfectly private and perfectly secure.
The scheme can support any aggregation function, at the cost of O(n) messages per
sensor.
Proof: The security of the basic scheme against an integrity-adversary can be
reduced to the security of SHIA proven in [CPS06]. Additionally, given that the
hash function is one way, U doesn’t get any information on the sensor measurements,
thus scheme is perfectly private.
The scheme can support any aggregation function since sensors have access
to all the raw data. However, this means that each node receives O(n) messages
during the integrity verification algorithm. 2
Remark. The high communication cost of the scheme eliminates the assumed
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Figure 4.8: PIA Solution 4: Improving efficiency by introducing a logical aggregation
tree within the aggregator node.
4.7.2 Improved PIA Solution 3.2
We now propose an algorithm that improves the efficiency of the integrity
verification algorithm but at the cost of limiting the aggregation functions that
can be supported. This is done by introducing a logical aggregation tree within
the aggregator node as seen in Figure 4.8. Accordingly, to recompute the network
aggregate, each node would require log n values instead of n values. We consider
the aggregation function sum.
Algorithm 6 Improved PIA Solution 3.2
Let ki be a MAC key shared between si and U . Let H denote a secure cryptographic
hash function.
1. A constructs a logical binary aggregation tree T where the leaf vertex vi is
associated with sensor si, with label `i = (1, xi, si). The internal vertex vi has label
`i = (ci, ai, hi) = (c1 + c2, a1 + a2, H(ci, `1, `2)) where `j = (cj, aj, hj), j = 1, 2 are
labels of the leaf vertices of vi. Then A sends `k to U where vk is the root of T .
2. U sends an authenticated broadcast of h to all sensors si.
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3. A sends si the labels of all siblings of the vertices that are on the path
from si to the root of T . This allows si to recompute the label of the root of T and
verify the correctness of h. If h is correct, then si sends ci = H(ki, OK) to A which
aggregates the values using the xor operation before forwarding to U .
4. If U verifies that all sensors si agree with the value h, then the alleged
aggregate y is correct.
Theorem 4.7.2 Improved PIA Solution 3.2 is perfectly private and perfectly secure.
The scheme supports all decomposable aggregation functions at the communication
cost of O(log n) per sensor.
Proof: The security proof of the algorithm closely follows that of SHIA [CPS06].
The proof outline is as follows: Commitment h of the root node of T forces the
adversary to choose a fixed set of leaf vertices labels. If any internal vertex vi of T
does not compute sub-aggregate ai correctly, then it will be detected by the sensors
as either (1) the disseminated label doesn’t match the computed one, or (2) h is not
verified. User U can detect if any sensors does not agree with h as the HMAC tag
can be forged with at best negligible probability.
The scheme is perfectly private as the hash function is secure and U doesn’t
get any other information about {xi}.
The integrity verification algorithm requires each node si to recompute the
sub-aggregates of the internal vertices on the path from si to the root node of T .
Since T has n leaf vertices, then the path length is log n. Thus si receives O(log n)
messages.
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Finally, the solution can only support decomposable functions which allow
for the construction of the hierarchical aggregation tree T . Such functions include,
mean, standard deviation, count and min/max. 2
4.8 Conclusion
As large sensor networks become prevalent in everyday life, privacy becomes
a critical issue that must be addressed. In this chapter, we point out the role of
privacy in integrity-assured data aggregation. We define the problem and analyze
the security model. We then investigate the tradeoff between privacy and aggregate
integrity verification in the single aggregator model. Our results, summarized in
Figure 1.5, show a clear tension between the privacy of the sensed data from the
user and the cost of the integrity verification. This cost consists of both the com-
munication incurred by sensor nodes as well as the range of aggregation functions
that can be supported by the integrity verification algorithm.
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Chapter 5
PIA in Publish-Subscribe Systems for Multiple Subscribers
In this chapter we address the problem of privacy-preserving integrity-assured
aggregation in publish-subscribe systems for multiple subscribers, where subscribers
can gain a competitive advantage if they can obtain verified aggregate information
before the others. Our solution distributes the verification functionality so that the
scheme satisfies the fairness property in the sense that subscribers can either all
correctly verify the aggregation process or they can detect all cheating subscribers.




We assume that a pub-sub system consists of a large set of publisher and
routing nodes in a routing network, while a small set of subscribers exist outside
of the routing network, as shown in Figure 5.1. When a subscriber subscribes to
the aggregate sum of data maintained by a set of publishers, the pub-sub system
constructs a routing tree along which routing nodes perform in-network aggregation.
Exactly how the pub-sub system should compute this routing tree is out of the









Figure 5.1: Publisher-subscriber model
computation algorithm.
After the routing path is established, each publisher pi publishes a variable vi
periodically synchronizing with the other publishers; that is, all the publishers pub-
lish their variables of each round with a sequence number n. This data is forwarded
along a routing tree where each routing node performs in-network data aggregation.
Each routing node aggregates variables with the same sequence number and sends
the aggregated variable to its parent node in the routing path. If each publisher pi
for i = 1 to n publishes a variable vi, each subscriber eventually receives from the
root routing node of the routing tree an aggregate sum
∑n
i=1 vi(n) at each round n.
Each entity, which manages either a publisher, a subscriber, or a routing node,
has a unique identifier. Every pair of publisher pi and subscriber sj share a pair-
wise secret Kji . Note that publishers in our system model are more tightly coupled
with subscribers than in many existing pub-sub systems; each subscriber explic-
itly specifies which publishers should provide raw data for the aggregate sum in a
subscription request. We also assume that subscribers know the routing topology
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within the routing network. This is an acceptable assumption since publisher nodes
are generally long lived and the routing topology is not dynamic.
Our aggregation protocol requires bidirectional communication channels among
publishers and routing nodes inside the routing network. However, although the
routing network forwards messages from routing nodes to subscribers, it does re-
ceive messages from those subscribers to either routing nodes or publishers.
5.1.2 Security Properties
In this paper, we study the problem of data privacy and integrity in a publisher-
subscriber setting. A pub-sub system that supports in-network aggregation should
satisfy the following security properties:
• Data privacy: Each subscriber learns only the aggregate of a set of published
data and no other information about the individual published data.
(We assume that publishers trust the routing nodes with respect to the privacy
of their data.)
• Aggregation integrity: A subscriber can verify the correctness of the alleged
aggregate without seeing raw data from the publishers.
• Fairness: Each subscriber can verify the integrity of the aggregate if and
only if all the other subscribers who also subscribe to that aggregate function
collaborate correctly.




We consider three different types of adversaries who try to violate the security
properties in Section 5.1.2. We also define security of the system with respect to
each adversary.
Privacy adversary (p-adversary) attacks the privacy of raw data from publishers.
Such an adversary is typically a subscriber who resides outside of the rout-
ing network and thus cannot access any messages within the routing network
except for those forwarded to the adversary from routing nodes in the network.
We consider that the system is secure against the p-adversary if at best, the
adversary can learn only the aggregate and no other information about the
individual published data.
Integrity adversary (i-adversary) attacks the security of the aggregation process.
The integrity-adversary can compromise a number of routing nodes in an
routing tree. Once a node is corrupted, the adversary has total control over
the private data of that node as well as its subsequent behaviors. On the
other hand, we assume that publishers are not part of an adversary against
subscribers because publishers can always modify the aggregated data by pro-
viding malicious input data while otherwise following the aggregation protocol
properly.
The objective of the adversary is to tamper with the aggregation process such
that subscribers accept an aggregation result, which is not the correct aggre-
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gate of the publishers’ raw data. An aggregation protocol is considered secure
if the adversary cannot successfully launch such an attack.
Subscriber adversary (s-adversary) can compromise one or more subscriber nodes.
Once compromised, the adversary has subsequent access to the subscriber’s
private information as well as control over its behaviors. The adversary is ac-
tive, meaning it can deviate from the protocol arbitrarily. The objective of the
s-adversary is to interfere with the collaborative verification of the aggregation
process and convince the other subscribers to accept a false verification result
or prevent them from accepting the correct aggregate.
The system is secure against the subscriber adversary, if at the end of the
protocol, honest subscribers can either correctly verify the integrity of the
aggregation process, or identify the malicious subscribers.
5.2 Basic Scheme
In this section we present our basic secure aggregation protocol for multiple
non-collaborative subscribers for the sum aggregate function. The subscribers do
not interact with each other in the basic protocol. Our scheme allows multiple sub-
scribers to verify the integrity of an aggregate sum independently, while ensuring
that the individual published data remains confidential with respect to the sub-
scribers. Note that the basic scheme described in this section does not satisfy the
fairness property in Section 5.1.2 we require; we will extend the basic protocol in
Section 5.3 to achieve that property.
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The basic protocol builds based upon the secure hierarchical in-network ag-
gregation (SHIA) scheme developed by Chan et al. [CPS06] for sensor networks.
We adapt it to the publish-subscribe network model by eliminating all subscriber-
initiated communication to the routing network. For the sake of brevity, we mainly
describe the following differences from SHIA.
• Elimination of an authenticated broadcast message from a subscriber, which
corresponds to a base station in a sensor network, to the nodes in the routing
network.
• Support of multiple subscribers to the same sum.
We only give only a high level description (and omit the details) of sub-protocols of
our scheme that are identical to those of SHIA. We refer the reader to the original
paper [CPS06] for further detail.
5.2.1 Protocol Overview
The basic scheme relies on an aggregation-commit-prove framework of SHIA
[CPS06]. Suppose that subscriber node si subscribes to the sum of the values from
publishers p1, . . . , pn in set P . As routing nodes aggregate data from publisher
nodes, they also iteratively construct a structure, which forms a commitment tree
over the published data using a cryptographic hash function. In particular, the pub-
lisher nodes and routing (aggregating) nodes respectively form the leaf and internal
vertices of the commitment tree. The final commitment value is the value of the
root node of the commitment tree. Once the aggregation and commitment phase
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is complete, each publisher receive the off-path values of the commitment tree from
other routing nodes and recompute the final commitment value. Each publisher
then forms a verification tag that summarizes its view of the aggregation process.
A subscriber can verify that all the published data were correctly aggregated to





Data1.  Published data is
aggregated and committed
2. Publishers verify the aggregation process,
send to subscriber < agg, vrf tag >





Figure 5.2: Overview of the basic scheme, for single subscriber.
The intuition of the protocol is that once the aggregation process is fixed,
each publishers individually ensures that the its data was added to the final aggre-
gate. This is done by rebuilding the aggregate and the commitment structure. If a
malicious aggregator at some point attempts to discard or reduce a legitimate pub-
lisher’s contribution, an inconsistent commitment structure will be generated and
the attack will be detected. This approach ensures a lower bound to be established
for the sum aggregate. An upper bound is also established using a similar approach
and the complement aggregate, defined as
∑
(r− di) where r is the upper bound
of the valid data range and di is the data of publisher i.
The algorithm consists of the following two main stages: aggregation-commit
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and verification. We assume that an aggregation tree already exists and spans over
the set of the publishers and routing nodes.
5.2.1.1 Aggregation-Commit
This phase is exactly same as that in SHIA. Each publisher node publishes
data to its parent routing node on the routing tree. Once a routing node hears back
from all of its children, it aggregates their data and constructs a new vertex label
in the commitment tree1. The label has the following format:
〈count, value, complement, commitment〉
where count is the number of leaf nodes in the subtree rooted at this routing node;
value is the sum aggregate computed over all the leaves in the subtree; complement
is the aggregate over the complement of the data values; and commitment is a
cryptographic commitment to value of the label and the labels of the child nodes in
the commitment tree.
The labels are defined inductively as follows: There is one leaf vertex up for
each publisher node p, which we call the leaf vertex of p. The label of up consists
of count=1, value=dp where dp is the data value published by p, complement=r −
dp where r is the upper bound on allowable data values, and commitment is the
publisher’s unique ID. Internal vertices represent the aggregation operations, and
have labels that are defined based on the labels of their child vertices. Suppose
an internal vertex has child vertices with the following labels: `1, · · · , `q , where
1Note that the aggregation tree and the commitment tree are identical in our scheme.
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`i = 〈ci, vi, v̄i, hi〉 for i = 1 to q. Then their parent vertex has label 〈c, v, v̄, h〉 where
c =
∑
ci , v =
∑
vi , v̄ =
∑
v̄i and h = H[N, c, v, v̄, `1, · · · , `q]. Here H is a
cryptographic hash function and N is the session sequence number.
Once the label is constructed, the routing node forwards it to its parent routing
node. Once the routing node at the root of the aggregation tree computes the final
label, it can either forward that label to the subscriber or wait until it also has the
result tags before forwarding.
5.2.1.2 Verification
In this stage, unlike SHIA, our protocol allows a subscriber to verify an aggre-
gate without sending an authenticated broadcast message to the publisher nodes in
the routing network. First, routing nodes disseminate information to the publisher
nodes that allow them to verify that their published data was correctly incorporated
into the aggregate. In particular, each publisher node pj receives the labels corre-
sponding to the set of all the siblings of each of the commitment tree vertices that
are on the path from pj to the root of the commitment tree. Once each publisher
pj reconstructs the label `
′
r of the root node r of the commitment tree, it computes
the following verification tag for subscriber si:





where Kij is a secret key shared between publisher pj and subscriber si. Notice that
the label `′r computed by pj could be different from the label `r computed at the
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Figure 5.3: Example aggregation graph for one subscriber S. On the right, we list
the labels of the nodes on the aggregation path of publisher E to the subscriber.
We then show what labels E receives to construct a verification tag τE.
that do not perform aggregation correctly. The verification tags are sent along the
aggregation tree and aggregated along the way with the xor function. Finally, the
root node r of the routing tree forwards its label `r and the xor of all the verification
tags ⊕pj∈Pτ ij to subscriber si. Recall that P is the set of publishers.
Subscriber si can verify that the aggregation of the published data was per-
formed correctly by checking that all the publishers constructed their verification
tags using the correct aggregate and commitment values. Subscriber si first recom-
putes each publisher pj’s verification tag τ
i
j using the the root label `r and shared
secret Kij. If the xor of all the computed tags is equal to that received from the
root routing node, si decides that the aggregate value value is computed correctly.
Figure 5.3 presents an example routing tree with five publisher nodes, and
shows how the data published by publisher E is aggregated and verified by the
89
subscriber S.
5.2.2 Verification by Multiple Subscribers
We extend the above setting to allow multiple subscribers to verify an aggre-
gation process. Suppose that there are m subscribers s1, . . . , sm in set S. Let us
assume that each publisher pj shares a secret key K
i
j with each subscriber si. At the
verification phase, each publisher pj constructs a separate verification tag τ
i
j for each






r) for i = 1 to m. Each routing node aggregates
verification tags for each subscriber si separately, using the xor function. Therefore







We prove the our basic scheme achieves the sum integrity property and the
data privacy property in Section 5.1.2. We only consider the case with a single
subscriber node in Section 5.2.1 since, without loss of generality, the arguments
in this section hold for the case with multiple subscribers. We first consider the
integrity property of the scheme. Our proofs for the integrity property rely on the
collision-resistant property of a cryptographic hash function; that is, an adversary
cannot construct the same xor value computed by subscriber si with different input
values (i.e., a different root label `′r or different shared secrets) from those used by
subscriber si.
Lemma 5.2.1 It is computationally infeasible for an adversary who does not know
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Proof: Suppose that an adversary does not know a shared secret Kij between pub-
lisher pj and subscriber si. Since publisher pj’s verification tag τ
i
j has no correlation
with the other publishers’ tags, the adversary cannot gain any information on xor





Lemma 5.2.2 If xor of all the verification tag ⊕τSp computed by subscriber si is
same as the xor tag provided by the root routing node, then that root node computes
the xor of all the confirmation tags received from the publishers.
Proof: Since the hash function H used to compute a confirmation tag is collision-
resistant, only publisher p who knows a shared secret Kij can compute each con-
firmation tag correctly. Therefore, by Lemma 5.2.1, the only way to computes the
correct xor of the tags ⊕τSp is to compute the xor of all the tags provided by the
publishers. 2




j computed by subscriber
si is same as the xor tag provided by the root routing node, then every publisher pj
must have used the same root label `r to compute its confirmation tag τ
i
j .





computes each τ ij using the the same root label `r, which si receives from the root
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routing node. By Lemma 5.2.2, the root routing node obtains the verification tag
for subscriber si by computing xor of all the tags from the publishers. Since the
hash function H is collision-resistant, each publisher must use the same label `r and
a shared secret Kij to compute its verification tag τ
i
j . 2




j computed by subscriber
si is same as the xor tag provided by the root routing node, then subscriber si can
be sure that all the publishers compute the same root label value by recomputing the
commitment tree.
Proof: By Lemma 5.2.3, subscriber si knows that the verification tag received
from the root routing node is computed by taking the XOR of all the publihsers’
correct verification tags. This implies that every publisher recomputed the the same
commitment tree and verified the same root label. 2
Since our basic protocol allows subscriber si to confirm that every publisher
verifies the commitment tree of the same root label, our protocol provides the same
integrity property as that of SHIA [CPS06]. Therefore, we state the following the-
orem regarding the integrity property of our protocol without proof.
Theorem 5.2.1 Let A be the final sum received by the subscriber si. If the sub-
scriber accepts A, then AL ≤ A ≤ (AL +µr) where AL is the sum of the data values
of all the honest publishers, µ is the total number of malicious nodes, and r is the
upper bound on the range of allowable values on each node.
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We next show that the basic protocol protects the privacy of each publisher’s
data from subscriber si.
Theorem 5.2.2 A subscriber si cannot learn any information on the publishers’
individual values except for the sum A of those values.
Proof: Subscriber si receives only an aggregate sum, the root label `r, and the









using each publisher’s individual values, it is computationally infeasible to obtain
those individual values from the output of the hash function H, which provides the
preimage resistant property. 2
5.3 Collaborative Protocol
In the basic scheme, publishers and routing nodes construct a separate veri-
fication tag for each subscriber. Each subscriber is thus able to individually verify
the integrity of the aggregation process. In this section, we focus on the problem
of collaborative subscribers, with the following properties: (i) subscribers can only
verify the integrity of the aggregate together; otherwise they don’t learn any infor-
mation on the validity of the aggregate; and (ii) any subscriber that misbehaves is
detected and identified.
We propose a solution where we distribute secret key shares amongst the
subscribers so that when the shares are combined with each other, the integrity
of the aggregation process can be verified. This is equivalent to a (n, n)-threshold
secret sharing scheme.
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To demonstrate the difficulty of our problem, we first show an initial attempt
and illustrate a critical denial of service attack that a malicious subscriber can
launch against the other subscribers. We then present our collaborative solution for
preventing this attack.
5.3.1 First Attempt
We modify the basic scheme for multiple subscribers proposed in the previous
section by requiring the routing nodes to combine all the subscribers’ verification
tags with the xor operation. The combined tag of m subscribers s1, . . . , sm in set
S thus is computed as τ = ⊕si∈S τ i.
The combined tag τ can then be verified if and only if all the subscribers col-
laborate to reveal their individual tags as follows. Once each subscriber si receives





j, N, `) where P is the set of publishers. Subscriber si then broad-
casts its individual tag τ i to the other subscribers. Once a subscriber receives the
individual tags of all the other subscribers, it can verify the integrity of the aggregate
sum received from the root node of the routing network. The above solution satisfies
both the sum integrity and privacy properties. Both properties can be proved using
a similar proof to that presented in Section 5.2.3.
The scheme, however, is insecure against malicious subscribers. In particular,
a malicious subscriber can force the verification tag to be verified as invalid, without
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Figure 5.4: Overview of the PIA collaborative scheme for multiple subscribers.
are honest and broadcast valid tag shares to the other subscribers, and sm who is
malicious, broadcasts an invalid tag share τm. Since τm is invalid, subscriber si
where 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1 determines that the combined verification tag is invalid.
However, it is impossible for si to determine if, (i) the tag is invalid because not all
publishers agree with the aggregation process, or (ii) it is invalid because a malicious
subscriber has broadcast a false verification tag. The honest subscribers are thus
denied the service.
5.3.2 Collaborative Scheme
Next we propose a collaborative scheme, which is secure against a privacy-
adversary, an integrity-adversary as well as a subscriber-adversary, defined in Sec-
tion 5.1.3. Intuitively, the scheme builds on our first attempt by first, combining
the individual verification tags so that the aggregate can be verified if and only if all
subscriber submit their true individual tags to the others. Second, the scheme en-
ables subscribers to verify the correctness of submitted tags from other subscribers.
The subscribers are thus forced to behave honestly, or else be detected as malicious.
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5.3.2.1 Protocol Overview
The collaborative scheme consists of three stages: (i) the aggregation-commit
stage, which is identical to that of the basic scheme, (ii) a modified verification
phase and (iii) a new subscriber-verification stage.
In the verification phase, each publisher pj additionally constructs a commit-
ment to a shared secret Kij with a subscriber si. Routing nodes aggregate those com-
mitments to shares by jointly constructing a hash tree. In the subscriber-verification
phase, subscribers first interact to verify the integrity of the aggregation process by
verifying the combined verification tag. If the tag is found to be invalid, each
subscriber must then prove the validity of its submitted tag share using its commit-
ment value. We describe our collaborative verification protocol for m subscribers
s1, · · · , sm in set S and n publishers p1, · · · , pn in set P .
5.3.2.2 Setup
Since our protocol requires each subscriber to disclose its secrets at each round
of publication, we assume that every pair of subscriber si and publisher pj gener-
ates a new shared secret at each round using a pseudo-random number generator
(PRNG) with a shared master secret Kij as a seed. A PRNG generates a sequence
of unpredictable values given a seed; i.e., PRNG : Zl × N→ Zl, where l is the size
of a secret. That is, PRNG generates a new secret from a master secret Kij and a
session sequence number N of each publication. It is computationally infeasible for
an adversary to deduce a new secret only from a series of previous secrets without
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knowing a master secret.
5.3.2.3 Aggregate-Commit-Prove
The aggregate-commit-prove phase is identical to that of the basic scheme,
described in Section 4, except for the aggregation of commitments to shared secrets
between publishers and subscribers. In particular, assume that publisher pj has
re-constructed the label ` of the root node of the aggregation tree. Publisher pj
also computes a verification tag τ ij and a commitment c
i
j to a shared secret K
i
j for
subscriber si, for i = 1, . . . ,m:






where Kij is the secret shared key between publisher pj and subscriber si and N is a




j), i ∈ [1,m] to its parent
routing node.
Routing node ak aggregates, with respect to each subscriber, all the com-
mitments and tag values it receives. Suppose a routing node ak has child nodes
v1, · · · , vt and receives message (τ ij , cij)i=1,··· ,m from child node vj. Then routing
node ak performs the following aggregations, for i = 1, . . . ,m:
τ ik = τ
i
1 ⊕ . . .⊕ τ it
cik = H(c
i
1, . . . , c
i
t)




k), i ∈ [1,m] to its parent routing node.
This continues until the root of the routing tree is reached. The root node of
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the routing tree, ar, then computes the combined verification tag using the xor
aggregation operation:
τ = τ 1r ⊕ · · · ⊕ τmr
and forwards 〈τ, c1r, . . . , cmr 〉 to the subscribers. For clarity, we present an example
of the above process in Figure 5.5. The figure shows how the commitment values of
publisher nodes D and E are aggregated along the routing tree.
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Figure 5.5: Construction of the commitment trees during the aggregate-commit
phase.
Note that the hash tree construction we have presented corresponds to what
is known as the Merkle hash tree [Mer80, Mer89]. In particular, a Merkle hash tree
is used to commit to a set of values, where the committed values correspond to the
tree leaf nodes and the value of the internal nodes is derived from the hash of the
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values of its child vertices.
5.3.2.4 Collaborate-Verification
Each subscriber si receives 〈`, τ, c1r, . . . , cmr 〉 where ` is the label containing
the alleged data aggregate and commitment over the aggregation process. Each
subscriber si does the following:
1. Using ` and its shared secrets Ki1, . . . , K
i
n, construct verification tag share τ
i.
2. Broadcast tag share τ i to all the other subscribers.
3. Once all tag shares are received, compute combined verification tag τ ′ = τ 1⊕
. . .⊕ τm and check if τ ?= τ ′.
4. If τ = τ ′, then we can conclude that the aggregation process has been com-
puted correctly and stop.
If τ 6= τ ′, then we must determine if aggregation process is incorrect or there
are malicious subscribers. Therefore, a prove request is broadcast to all the
subscribers.
5. Once a prove request is received, subscribers must prove that they have sub-
mitted valid tag shares. To do this, each subscriber si reveals enough key
information to enable another subscriber sj to verify that commitment value
ci corresponds to the tag share τ i. The details of the proof are presented in
Section 5.2.3.
If malicious subscribers are detected and identified, the protocol is stopped.
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6. If all subscribers have been verified honest, then we can conclude that the
combined aggregation tag is invalid because an aggregating routing node has
falsified the aggregation process.
5.3.2.5 Proof Protocol
Subscriber si can prove that the submitted verification tag τ
i is related to the
commitment value ci by disclosing the set of secret keys that it shares with all the
publisher nodes, i.e., Ki1, . . . , K
i
n. Then a verifying subscriber sj can verify that the
submitted tag τ i corresponds to the commitment ci by:
1. Checking the validity of the submitted keys by computing the commitment c̃i
using the keys and session sequence number, and checking if ci
?
= c̃i. (We here
assume that each subscriber si knows the topology of the routing network to
compute the same commitment tree, but we can remove this assumption if the
root routing node computes the commitment of all the shared secrets for each
subscriber si.)
2. If ci 6= c̃i, then the submitted keys are invalid and subscriber si is identified
as malicious. Protocol is stopped.
If ci = c̃i, then the submitted keys are correct.
3. Verifying subscriber sj then confirms that the verification tag share submitted
by si is correct by recomputing the share using `,N and the submitted keys.
If tag share does not verify, si is identified as malicious. Protocol is stopped.
Else si is honest.
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Note that subscribers need to exchange their secrets with each other only
when some subscribers fail to verify the verification tag of an aggregate sum. We
expect this is a rare case since we expect that a pub-sub system removes malicious
subscribers once they are detected.
5.3.3 Analysis
Lemma 5.3.1 An integrity-adversary does not gain any security advantage by mod-
ifying the commitment values.
Proof: The goal of the integrity-adversary is to force the subscribers to accept a
false aggregation value in a stealthy manner. Now consider an integrity-adversary
that not only falsified the aggregation operation but also the commitment values.
An incorrect commitment value ci will only lead to an inconsistency in the proof
protocol submitted by subscriber si and the incorrect conclusion that si is malicious.
Such a conclusion does not add to the security advantage of the integrity-adversary.
2
Because of Lemma 5.3.1, henceforth we assume that the integrity-adversary
does not falsify the commitment value by deviating from the protocol.
We use Theorems 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 from the basic protocol to show that the
aggregation scheme is privacy-preserving and integrity-assured aggregation.
In the following, we assume that all subscribers send messages. A subscriber
that stops the protocol by not sending a message always wins and we therefore
ignore this case.
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Theorem 5.3.1 Subscriber si can verify a combined verification tag τ if and only
if it receives the correct verification tag of all the other subscribers, given an alleged
aggregate and session sequence number.
Proof: To verify a combined verification tag, each subscriber si independently
constructs its tag share τ i which depends on the secret keys of si, the alleged aggre-
gate and the session sequence number. Note that subscriber si cannot forge the tag
share of another subscriber sj since it does not have access to its keys (this follows
from the security of the cryptographic hash function).
The combined verification tag can only be correctly verified if the computed
combined tag is equal to an ideal value that depends on all the subscriber secret
keys, the alleged aggregate and the session sequence number. If any of these values
are incorrect, then the computed combined tag is not equal to the ideal value and
thus the verification fails. 2
Theorem 5.3.2 A malicious subscriber that deviates from the subscriber-verification
protocol is detected and identified.
Proof: A malicious subscriber can either submit an invalid individual verification
tag or an invalid set of secret keys during the subscriber-verification protocol. If
an invalid set of secret keys is submitted, then the malicious subscriber is always
detected and identified because the keys do not match those that generate the
commitment tree. This follows from the collision-resistance property of the hash
function. If an invalid individual verification tag is submitted, other subscribers can
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compute the tag with a set of verified secrets and the root label of the aggregation
tree provided from the routing network. Because of the collision-resistance of the
hash function, a malicious subscriber cannot change the set of secret keys used to
generate the commitment. Therefore the malicious subscriber is always detected
and identified if it does not use identical sets of keys for the commitment and the
verification values. 2
Lemma 5.3.2 The subscriber-verification scheme is forward secure; i.e., even when
the subscribers reveal their secret keys, all subsequently executed subscriber-verification
protocols are secure.
Proof: Reduced to the security of the PRNG. 2
5.4 Future Directions
In the future, we plan to extending our work in three main directions. First, we
would like to improve the efficiency of the subscriber-verification protocol. Currently
to verify the honesty of subscribers, the communication cost of each subscriber is
O(nm), where there are n publishers and m subscribers in the network. Although
in this work we assume that subscribers are not energy constrained, it would be
desirable to reduce the communication exchange between the subscribers. Second,
we would like to reduce our trust assumptions, such that the confidentiality of the
raw published data need be preserved with respect to routing nodes as well as
subscribers. Currently our model assumes that publishers trust the routing nodes
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with respect to the confidentiality of their raw data. Finally, we plan to extend
our secure and verifiable aggregation scheme to support other aggregation functions
such as higher order statistics such as quantiles. Currently we can support only




Du and Hwang [DH93] presented a bijective algorithm, where at each step, if
an impure set X is discovered, then the algorithm bisects X and tests the resulting
two subsets X1 and X2. They propose the following partitioning rule:
Algorithm 7 Optimized Bijective Rule
Input: Set X.
Output: Result sets X1, X2, such that X1 ∪X2 = X.
Bisect X into subsets X1 and X2, where X1 contains 2
dlog |X|e−1 nodes and X2 =
X \X1.
This rule partitions the network such that the detection tree is made up of one
complete and one incomplete binary subtree. Figure 3.1 uses this rule to partition
the network of 12 nodes. We refer the reader to the original paper for the proof of
the theorem.
Theorem A.0.1 Given an input set of nodes N, partition degree 2 and the bisecting




1) + 1 partitions before outputting all the compromised nodes.
Figure A.1 shows the behavior of the partition cost of the binary identification
algorithm when the Du and Hwang’s partition rule is used and compares this cost
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Figure A.1: Comparison of the analytical and experimental bounds with the baseline
solution.
with the total cost of the trivial scheme. The figure shows that when considering
the partition cost of the identification algorithm alone, the identification algorithm
performs better than the trivial solution for up to 128 compromised nodes. Therefore
if an adversary compromises more than 128 nodes in the network (or 1
8
th of the total
nodes in the network) then aggregation is not a useful primitive for a secure and
defensive network.
The figure also compares the analytical partition cost obtained from Theorem
A.0.1 and the numerical partition cost computed experimentally. The numerical
results yield exact results. Although the analytical curve follows the numerical curve
faithfully, it does produce significant error for c > 128, where c denotes the number
of compromised nodes. The experimental curve reaches a plateau at c = 128. This
can be explained as if c = 128, the worst distribution of compromised nodes requires
the testing of every single node; consequently no extra test is required for c > 128.
106
Appendix B
Key Establishment in Heterogeneous Self-Organized Networks
[TSN07]
Traditional ad hoc and sensor network settings generally assume a trusted third
party (TTP) who is trusted with the keying information and enables secure deliv-
ery of keys to the network principals and/or nodes. Security associations, such as
authentication of nodes or securing communication channels, are then bootstrapped
using this information. In key pre-distribution schemes, the TTP allocates keys to
each node prior to deployment either randomly from a key pool [EG02, CPS03],
or by using a well-defined combinatorial structure such as a t-design [LS05] that
ensures the key subsets allocated to the nodes satisfy certain properties.
However, the assumption of a single TTP can be restrictive in scenarios where
the network is self-organized and formed without prior planning. In the following
we list some of the immediate applications that require distribution of trust. The
first example is in disaster response scenarios where a network may be formed with
members belonging to different administrative domains. Furthermore, it might be
impossible to access an outside authority due to the lack of preexisting infrastruc-
ture or inability to contact off-site systems [LMFJ+04]. In such life-threatening
situations, it is not acceptable to deny data from a legitimate principal that might
save someone’s life. Therefore a ‘best-effort’ security model might be appropriate
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in this scenario, allowing strong guarantees when a single TTP can be established
and weaker guarantees when no TTP can be assumed. Similarly in combat situa-
tions it is essential to allow members of a coalition to join and form collaborative
groups. In such dynamic coalitions there is typically no single TTP prior to or
during deployment.
Existence of a TTP is also in immediate conflict with privacy enhancing ap-
plications. As sensor and ad hoc testbeds have been deployed, it has become clear
that user privacy can be easily compromised as a side effect to seemingly innocuous
applications [CP03]. For example a humidity sensing network can also be used to
monitor activity in a room as the human body effectively alters the room humidity.
Therefore by removing the presence of an all knowing authority (i.e., the TTP),
communication can be made private to the restricted user set.
Finally, to allow the wide adoption of sensor and ad hoc networks in everyday
scenarios, it is desirable to reduce the required knowledge base of network owners.
Customers should be able to purchase a set of nodes that are usable upon purchase
without requiring the presence of a network administrator. Therefore the node
manufacturer can install public data in the nodes that can bootstrap future security
associations.
In the following we focus on the problem of group key distribution in self-
organized ad hoc and sensor networks where no single point of trust exists. A
group key allows nodes to securely communicate with each other and participate
in collaborative tasks. The dynamic property of the network allow new nodes to
join or exiting nodes to leave the group. This is an essential mechanism in the
108
first two applications listed above. We consider heterogeneous networks consisting
of two types of nodes: typical low performance sensor nodes and more powerful
nodes with more computation and communication resources. It has been recently
shown [DL05, Eco] that networks that consist of homogeneous nodes cannot scale
well and also have lower performance compared to networks that include a number
of more powerful nodes. Introducing more powerful nodes also improves reliability
and lifetime of the network [Eco]. Furthermore [TCC+06] showed that pairwise
communication security in the presence of a TTP is not necessarily sacrificed if a
key distribution scheme leverages the existence of more capable nodes.
B.0.1 Related Work
The first work on key pre-distribution in ad hoc network without a TTP is due
to Chan [Cha04]. In this construction each group member individually selects his
keys from a common public key pool in a specified way. The aim of the protocol is to
probabilistically construct a Cover Free Family (CFF) that will ensure shared keys
between nodes. After the key selection phase, nodes follow a shared key discovery
protocol that uses homomorphic encryption to discover nodes’ shared keys. Chan
showed that his scheme allows any two nodes to communicate securely with a high
probability and the system provides security against collusion attack. However,
[WW05] showed that the probability that the constructed structure is a CFF is
very low and so the protocol cannot achieve its stated goal.
The closest work to our scheme is Luo et al. [LSNBS06] who proposes a prob-
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abilistic group key management protocol (referred to as LSBS) for ad hoc homo-
geneous networks. The objective of LSBS is to establish a common shared key for
the whole group. The protocol consists of three phases. In the setup phase, each
node randomly selects a set of keys from the key pool and performs a shared key
discovery (SKD) protocol with each neighboring node to discover shared keys. The
group key is generated by special subsets of nodes called initiating groups (IG),
and is distributed by flooding the network. Although LSBS protocol achieves its
stated goal, in practice there are challenges that if not addressed makes the protocol
impractical. In particular, our simulation of LSBS in [TSN07] show the following
shortcomings in the protocol.
Firstly, LSBS implicitly assumes that a single IG is formed where in practice
many IGs may simultaneously exist. In fact our simulation results show that in a
network of 1000 nodes, where each node has a key ring of size 150 keys, we can
form up to 100 IGs. To obtain a single group key for all nodes some mechanism for
negotiation and/or cooperation among IGs is required, which substantially increases
the communication and computation cost which is very undesirable in a resource
constrained network. The solutions also needs to be carefully designed to prevent
security compromise. The communication cost of the shared key discovery (SSD)
phase of the protocol is O(l) where l is the size of the key ring. LSBS requires a
node u to execute the SSD protocol with all of its neighboring nodes. If on average
a node is in the neighborhood of d other nodes, a communication cost of O(d · l) per
node is incurred. For networks with battery powered nodes it is essential to reduce
this cost in order to prolong network lifetime. Finally, LSBS is analyzed using a
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simple threat model that does not take into account real life threats in a wide range
of application scenarios. The adversary is considered passive and can only eavesdrop
on the communications. Given that the key pool is public, the adversary’s objective
is to either determine the node key or the link key that secures the link between
two nodes. In sensor networks it is common to assume that the adversary can
compromise a subset of nodes and obtain the secret information of the nodes. Such
information includes the key rings of the node and the keys that the nodes share with
their neighbors. This latter information will reduce the effort required for finding
the key rings of uncompromised nodes, and/or the link keys for links between the
compromised node and its neighbor nodes.
B.0.2 Our Contribution
In this appendix, we propose a Layered Key Pre-Distribution (LKD) Scheme
for networks of heterogenous nodes: resource constrained nodes and a small number
of high performance nodes (level 1) which have more resources and are possibly
better protected (e.g., use tamper proof hardware). LKD uses an unbalanced distri-
bution of keys, where high performance nodes are allocated a larger key ring. The
level 1-centric clusters that are formed around result in more efficient generation of
group keys.
We give a probabilistic analysis of the protocol and show that the inclusion
of a small number of more powerful nodes in the network results in constant com-
munication and computation cost, independent of the neighborhood size of a node.
111
We support our analysis via simulation results. We next evaluate the security of the
protocol in a strengthened security model. We argue that with a public key pool
and without a TTP, previous proposed threat models and security metrics such as
network resiliency [CPS03, EG02], which assumed secret key pool and a TTP, are
no longer valid. We update these definitions for our new system and trust model
and define a new security metric called neighbor resiliency. We analyze the security
of both LKD and LSBS under this new threat model. Our analysis shows that
LKD achieves better security than LSBS against node compromising adversaries
because sensing nodes in LKD learn much less information about the nodes in their
neighborhood.
B.1 System Model
We consider the network to be fully self-organized, meaning that there is no
infrastructure (hence no public key (PK) infrastructure). Traditional network mod-
els considered for sensor models not only assume a homogeneous network but also
assume either a grid or a random graph [EG02, CPS03] model where all neighboring
nodes are in communication contact. A more realistic model takes into considera-
tion the various signal-blocking barriers and interference sources such as hills and
buildings that exist in the deployed environment. In practice, deployed nodes are
often segregated into exclusive neighborhoods due to the features of the landscape
[TCC+06]. Our model accounts for this by considering a cluster based network,
where sensor nodes form ad hoc groups around more powerful nodes which act as
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the backbone of the network. Therefore the sensor nodes connect to the rest of the
network through the powerful ‘gateway’ nodes.
We assume a heterogeneous sensor network of size n consisting of two types of
nodes: sensing or level 2 (L2) nodes which are resource constrained and have limited
storage and energy capabilities and level 1 (L1) nodes which are more capable, with
larger memory, more powerful transceivers and energy source. As a result L1 nodes
can store larger key rings and other state data as well as communicate with a larger
neighborhood of nodes. The network consists of c L1 nodes and (n − c) L2 nodes.
Example L2 nodes are small Berkeley Mica2 motes with 8-bit 4MHz processors and
128 KB memories [MIC]. L1 nodes can be more powerful nodes such as laptops
or other portable devices. Such devices have better physical protection against
compromise, such as the use of tamper resistance hardware. However for simplicity,
we assume the same type of protection for L1 and L2 nodes. We also assume that
each node ui has a unique identifier i.
B.1.1 Trust Model
We assume that the network has no central authority or a single TTP. Each
node essentially acts as its own domain authority. Public information (e.g. the key
pool) is available to all, including malicious parties.
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B.1.2 Authentication
Since we do not assume any TTP, it is impossible to establish strong authen-
tication and identification amongst network nodes. We weaken our requirements
such that to control the join of malicious nodes to the group, we assume some aux-
iliary identification mechanism for nodes (e.g., node hardware). Details of such a
mechanism is outside the realm of our work.
B.2 Layered Key Pre-Distribution (LKD) Scheme
In this section we describe the LKD scheme to establish both pairwise and
group keys in a self-organized network that does not have a TTP. The heterogenous
network consists of resource constrained nodes (L2) and more capable nodes (L1)
that contain a larger portion of the key pool than L2 nodes. It follows that L1
nodes are able to establish secure links with a larger portion of the nodes. In each
neighborhood, local (l, r)-secure groups are established where l denotes the security
level and r is the minimum number of nodes in the group. We will show later that r
does not effect the security of the protocol and is used for efficiency purposes. Local
groups in a neighborhood together generate a cluster group key which are exchanged
to contributively generate a network group key. We ensure that the key generated
in each layer (i.e. local, cluster or network) is independent. The overall algorithm
consists of the following phases: initial setup, neighborhood discovery, cluster and
group key generation, join and leave.
In the initial setup phase nodes agree on parameters used in the protocol.
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The system parameters include a public key pool and its partition into κ blocks
of size m each. The security parameter is l which defines the level of link security
by specifying the minimum number of keys two nodes need to share to establish a
secure communication channel. The size of the key rings of L1 and L2 nodes are
also set to kA and kB. We note that these parameters can either be set by the node
manufacturers or during an initial setup phase prior to deployment.
A node ui randomly selects one key from each key block to form a key ring
{Kij}kj=1, where k = kA or kB. Let kB = κ. Thus an L1 node needs to choose
multiple keys from each block. Let kA = tkB + s, where t, s ∈ Z. Node selects t
keys from block 1 to (k− s) and select (t+ 1) keys from blocks (k− s) + 1 to block
k (in total s key blocks).
B.2.1 Neighborhood Discovery Phase
In this phase, L1 nodes initially send beacons identifying themselves to their
neighborhood nodes. The beacon message for L1 node ui can take the simple syntax
of < i, L1 > where i is the node identifier.
An L2 node ‘discovers’ an L1 node when it hears its beacon message. To estab-
lish a secure channel with the L1 and help populate L1’s incidence matrix, it runs
a secure shared key discovery (SSKD) protocol, reminiscent of [Cha04, LSNBS06].
This SSKD protocol is essentially a privacy preserving set intersection protocol that
allows the two participating parties to discover their shared keys from their individ-
ual key sets.
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For L1 node vi, the incidence matrix I
i has k columns labeled by the node
keys {Kij}kj=1, and one row for each neighbor. I i(j, t) = 1 if Kit is shared with node
uj in the neighborhood of vi, and zero otherwise. The incidence matrix of vi can
be used to keep an account of the keys shared by the nodes in L1’s neighborhood,
given that the keys are shared with vi. This property is important as it maintains
the optimal privacy for the neighboring L2 nodes. Specifically vi does not learn any
information about the key ring of its neighboring nodes other than the shared key
information it learns during the execution of the SSKD protocol.
If an L2 node is not directly connected to an L1 node (i.e. it is isolated from
an L2), it simply waits and performs the join protocol after the key establishment
protocol is complete. In this step, L1 nodes also discover each other and establish
an l-secure channel between pairs of nodes. This communication network forms the
backbone of the larger network.
B.2.2 Secure Shared Key Discovery (SSKD)
Consider the case when node uj wants to discover the keys it shares with node
ui. Let ui have keys {Kij}li=1 and uj have {Kij}mi=1, where l,m ∈ Z. Assume the
existence of a homomorphic encryption scheme, where Ek(m) denotes encrypting
message m using key k. The SSD protocol is as follows:
1. ui forms fi(x) =
∏l
j=1(x−Kij) and send to uj the encrypted coefficients, EKi(·).
2. uj computes zg = EKi(rfi(K
j
g)) using the homomorphic property of the encryption
scheme, where r is a random number. uj returns zg to ui.
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3. ui decrypts zg to obtain rfi(K
j
g). If value is zero, then they have a common key.
4. ui returns to uj an m-bit bitmap with 1 at bits where rfi(K
j
g) = 0 and 0 elsewhere.
In contrast to LSBS, our SSKD protocol requires the nodes to exchange an
m-bit bitmap indicating the shared keys of the participating nodes (step 4). The
main reason for this inclusion is that L1 nodes in LKD can select more than one
key from each block and so nodes must indicate which key in the block is shared or
not, using the bitmap.
B.2.3 Securing Bitmap Transmission
A potential security leakage is the bitmap exchange step of the SSD, which
identifies to an eavesdropper the number of keys shared by two nodes. A smart
adversary can then compromise a neighboring node which shares the most keys
with a target node, as well as reducing the search space for the channel securing
key.
The following protocol takes advantage of the privacy preserving characteris-
tics of a homomorphic encryption scheme such as El Gamal [Gam85]. Assume node
ui wants to privately send a k-bit bitmap b to node uj. We use the multiplicative
homomorphic properties of the El Gamal [Gam85] encryption scheme for ui to send
b to uj. Specifically this property is defined as: EK(m1m2) = EK(m1) × EK(m2)
where EK(m) is the encryption of m using key K.
Let the El Gamal public key of uj be (g, h) and the secret key be (x = loggh).
uj → ui: r, d← {0, 1}∗; Send < C1, C2 >=< gr, hr · d >, (g, h)
117
ui → uj: r′ ← {0, 1}∗; Send < C3, C4 >=< C1gr′ , C2hr′ ·m >
uj: bitmap b = C4Cx3 ·d
Node uj encrypts a dummy message d and sends to ui the ciphertext and its
PK. ui multiplies the bitmap with the ciphertext and randomizes the message using
r′. Using its private key, uj can decrypt the processed ciphertext and obtain the
bitmap. This protocol ensures that the bitmap remains private to ui, uj assuming
the El Gamal encryption scheme is secure.
By loading nodes with a set of random r values and associated gr, hr during
the setup phase it is possible to reduce computation to one exponentiation and
two multiplications per node. Furthermore we note that although we are using PK
cryptography, we do not rely on the existence of a PKI and therefore we preserve
the distributed nature of the network. Finally, we point out that this step is only
performed once or twice by sensing nodes through out their lifetime. [TSN07] shows
further techniques to reduce energy consumption during this step.
B.2.4 Cluster and Group Key Generation
In this phase, L1 nodes vi use their incidence matrix I
i to assist the nodes
in their neighborhoods to initiate local (l, r) groups where a minimum of r nodes
share l keys. This is done by finding a set of r rows R and at least l columns L in
the incidence matrix for which an (l, r)-secure subset can be formed. The formation
of the local groups allow vi to communicate to a group of nodes via multicast thus
reducing communication. Also nodes in local groups contribute to the formation of
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the cluster keys thus preventing the selection of weak keys. Once a local (l, r) group
is formed, vi informs the group members of their group membership using secure
channels. Local group members now can communicate securely using their secret
group key KL, which is the XOR of the group shared keys. Each local group Li in
cluster C contributively generate a partial cluster key KLiC in order to democratically
agree on a cluster key KC = ⊕i KLiC .
Potentially two L2 nodes which are not in direct communication can belong
to the same local group. In this case, the L1 node can be used as an intermediate
routing point to forward messages. Also if L1 nodes use directed antennas, L1 node
can group an (l, r) subset together iff they are in the same vicinity.
The group key can be generated similar to the cluster key by requiring nodes
to select a key share for the group key along with the cluster key share. L1 nodes
then exchange the partial group key generated in their neighborhoods to arrive at
the final group key.
B.2.5 Join and Leave
A newly deployed node ui can join the network by establishing an l-secure
channel to a node uj which already belongs to the secure group. uj essentially acts
for ui as the ‘gateway’ to the network. In the case of an L2 node ui leaving the group,
the neighborhood L1 node uses its incidence matrix to determine the effected keys
and purging them. Thus the departing node has no information regarding the key
rings of the nodes in its neighborhood. Due to space constraint, we refer the reader
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to [TSN07] for more details of these protocols.
B.3 Correctness Analysis
In this section we show the correctness of the LKD protocol. We say that LKD
is correct if the protocol allows the ‘backbone’ L1-network as well as the cluster of
L2 nodes around an L1 node, to be connected and thus functioning with a high
probability. Later we verify our results by simulation.
In our theoretical analysis we limit the key ring size of L1 nodes kA = t ·kB +s
as follows (kB is the key ring size of L2 nodes): t = 1, s = [0..kB]. We analyze the
general case when s can be assigned any value from [0..kB]. We refer the reader to
[TSN07] for the special case when s = kB. To establish an l-secure link, two nodes
share at least l keys. For readability purposes, in the rest of the paper we use the
notation A and B to refer to L1 and L2 nodes respectively.
Let set S consist of the s key blocks from which an L1 node selects two keys
and let S̄ consist of the remaining k− s key blocks. Let PA,B(r, l) be the probability
of r nodes (one L1 node and (r−1) L2 nodes) sharing at least l keys. Let Zx be the
event that r nodes share a key in a given block x. The probability that Zx occurs, is
equal to ps for blocks x ∈ S, and ps̄ for x ∈ S̄. Key collisions for each block can be
modeled as independent Bernoulli trials. The generating function for probabilities
PA,B(r, l) is calculated as the product of two binomials with success probabilities of
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ps and ps̄:
f(x) = (psx+ (1− ps))s(ps̄x+ (1− ps̄))k−s (B.1)
Proposition B.3.1 The probability that the r nodes share exactly l keys is equal
to the coefficient Cl of the x
l term in polynomial Equation B.1, and PA,B(r, l) =∑kB
i=l Ci, where Ci is the coefficient of the x
i term in f(x) and kB denotes the size
of the key ring of L2 nodes.1
Proposition B.3.2 Let PA,A(2, l) be the probability of two L1 nodes sharing at least
l keys. Let α, β, γ be non-negative integers satisfying 2α + β + γ = l. Let pi be the
probability of sharing i keys for the first s blocks and p̃i be the probability of sharing
























This proposition is based on the fact that the first s blocks can contribute 0, 1 or 2
shared keys per block, and the last (k− s) blocks can contribute 0 or 1 shared keys
per block. In the above formulae, α represents blocks that share 2 keys and β and γ
represent blocks that share only 1 key in S and S̄ respectively. For a more detailed
proof, refer to [TSN07].
Figure B.1(a) compares the probabilities of two nodes establishing an l-secure
channel for different node types, when the key pool is made up of 200 blocks, with a
1Examples to illustrate how the above proposition can be used are provided in [TSN07].
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block size of five keys. We can see a rapid transition in the probability of establishing
an l-secure channel for different l. Figure B.1(b) generalizes the node pair to groups
of r nodes. It is intuitive that establishing an l-secure channel becomes less probable
as the group size increases. We also note that when there is a high probability for
l-secure channel among r nodes, the probability of establishing a secure channel
between two L1 nodes will be an even higher value. It is also interesting to note that
the phase transition becomes slower as the number of nodes in the group increases.
Figure. B.1(c) graphs the probability of establishing an l-secure channel between an
L1 node and an L2 node for different values of s. The results confirm intuition by
showing that as the key ring of an L1 node becomes larger, the probability of a secure
connection with a L2 node increases. A similar result is verified in Figure B.1(d)
when we consider r nodes, consisting of one L1 node and (r − 1) L2 nodes.
In a more general version of this problem, a node can select extra keys from
any block of its choosing, rather than the first s blocks. It is intuitive that in this
version of the problem, the probabilities of establishing an l-secure channel do not
increase to the same extent as the more special case presented above. We leave the
analysis of this problem as a future exercise.
The graphs presented in this section allow a network administrator to choose
appropriate values for the system parameters. In the following section, we show
how an increased key ring not only increases the probability of establishing a secure
channel (as shown), but also decreases the security of the system. It is therefore
important to achieve the proper balance between connectivity and security. Section
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(a) Two nodes, kA = 2kB


















Probability of establishing l!secure channel between r nodes





(b) (r − 1) L2, one L1 node, kA = 2kB


























Probability of sharing l keys between an L1 node and an L2 node, for k_A = k_B + s
(c) Two nodes, kA = 2kB + s


























Probability of sharing l keys between an L1 node and (r!1) L2 nodes, for k_A = k_B + s
(d) (r − 1) L2, one L1 nodes,kA = 2kB + s
Figure B.1: Probability of establishing an l-secure channel.
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B.5 gives simulation results to confirm the theoretical results.
B.4 Security Model and Analysis
We analyze the security of LKD against two types of adversaries: (i) Passive
adversary with only access to public data, protocol description and transcript of
node communications; (ii) Node Capturing (NC) adversary with access to all the
information available to a passive adversary, and also the private data of nodes that
it has captured. We do not allow a NC adversary to interact with the nodes. That
is we only consider the case when the adversary uses its information to eavesdrop
on others’ communication. The goal of both adversaries therefore, is to learn the
secret keys between nodes that are used to secure their links.
The security of traditional key pre-distribution schemes that assume the exis-
tence of a TTP [EG02, CPS03, DDH+05, LN03] are based on the facts that (i) the
keys in the key pool are exclusively secret to the TTP, (ii) nodes key ring are private,
and (iii) the link communication is confidential. In this model an adversary cannot
introduce a ‘new’ device into the network because even if there is no authentication
mechanism, it does not have access to the key pool. However by compromising legit-
imate nodes and obtaining their key rings and/or identities, an adversary can gain
entrance into the secure network. The more nodes an adversary compromises, the
more it learns of the key pool and the more effective an attack it can launch against
a target secure channel. This notion is captured by the resiliency of the protocol
against node compromise, where resiliency metric is defined to be “the fraction of
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links in the network a node-compromising adversary is able to eavesdrop on, as a
result of recovering keys from captured nodes”[CPS03]. A protocol has stronger
security if the adversary is forced to compromise a larger percentage of the nodes
to eavesdrop on a target channel. Also, in [EG02, CPS03] information that an NC
adversary obtains from captured devices combined with the key indices allows him
to gain information about the keys belonging to other network nodes.
The security of the self-organized (SO) protocols do not rest on the secrecy
of the key pool; in fact, the key pool is considered to be public information and
can be accessed by the adversary. This means that if there are no auxiliary means
of authentication, the adversary can introduce a malicious node v with the aim of
extracting key information from a victim node u: v can choose a key ring and run
SKD with u to find out a subset of keys of u (that they share). It can then select a
new key ring and repeat the protocol. After sufficient runs of this, v can learn all the
keys of u. This means that it is crucial to assume a method of node authentication
that prevents the adversary from introducing nodes of its choice. Since this is not
the focus of our paper, we do not consider this scenario and leave it for future work.
The security of the SO protocols is based exclusively on (i) the size of the
key pool and (ii) the security of link keys. In LKD, a NC advesary gains only local
information from a compromised node; that is, it learns only the key ring of the node
and potentially any information it shares with nodes it associates with. In the case
of LKD, a node ui associates only with its neighboring nodes Ni; by compromising
ui an adversary learns not only the key ring of ui but also the keys it shares with its
neighboring nodes. Thus by compromising ui, the adversary can tighten its search
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space when attacking (i) a link between two nodes where at least one is neighbor
to ui or (ii) the key ring of a node neighbor to ui. We capture this notion in the
following security parameter for the SO model: Neighbor resiliency is defined as
the fraction of the key pool the adversary can discard in its exhaustive key search
to attack a target secure channel, as a result of recovering keys from neighboring
captured nodes. Another security metric we consider is the advantage the adversary
gains in determining the key ring of a node when it is in the neighborhood of a
compromised node.
In the following, we analyze LKD against first a passive and then a NC ad-
versary. An eavesdropping adversary cannot obtain any information about the keys
except to exhaustively guess at the final shared key between nodes. This is because
in the course of the key establishment protocol, no information about the key ring of
the nodes is leaked. The adversary knows that there are N = mk possible keys and
at least l keys from k different possible blocks are used to secure a link. Thus, the
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Due to space constraints, we refer the reader to [TSN07] for the detailed analysis of
LSBS.
Because L2 nodes in LKD do not compute an incidence matrix, a compro-
mised L2 node uc does not leak any keying information about its neighboring nodes.
However the adversary does learn (i) The keys that uc has in common with the L1
node in its cluster, or if it is not connected to an L1 node, the connecting L2 node;
(ii) If it is part of an (l, r)-secure local group, only the keys it shares with all of
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them.
Consider three nodes ui, uj and uc. Assume ui ∈ Nc, ui ∈ Nj, and uc is a
compromised node. Let k be the size of the key rings of uc, ui, uj respectively. The
goal of the adversary is to break the secret link between ui, uj. By compromising uc,
the adversary obtained the following information: uc and ui share b keys and do not
share (kc − b). To guess the key ring of ui, the adversaries’ search space is reduced
from mk to mk−b. The search space to exhaustively guess l shared keys between
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However the number of links and nodes to which these reduced probabilities
can be applied to has been decreased dramatically. This is primarily because LKD
does not require an L2 node to connect to every node in its neighborhood. Instead
the number of secure connections an L2 node needs to establish as well as the keys
it shares with neighboring nodes has been reduced to only those that are necessary.
In the event that an adversary compromises an L1 node and the L1 node does
not have any tamper resistant hardware, the adversary gains keying information
about all the nodes in its neighborhood. In this case the adversary gains as much
information as in the LSBS protocol. Since the majority of the nodes in the network
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are L2 nodes, we can conclude that on average the advantage that an adversary gains
by compromising nodes in LKD has been reduced and therefore LKD is more secure
than LSBS.
B.5 Simulation and Discussion
The simulation assumes a static network of n = 1060 nodes, consisting of 60
L1 nodes and 1000 L2 nodes. This is a reasonable assumption in a dense static
network or a highly dynamic network when nodes move around but in a bounded
region (e.g a group of rescuers in an emergency situation or troops in a battlefield).
We assume that L1 nodes have twice the transmission range RA of L2 nodes RB.
To guarantee network connectivity and thus allow a large portion of the nodes
to participate in the secure group communication, we use the system parameter
relationships derived by [EG02] based on the phase transition theory of Erdös and
Rényi for connected random graphs. For network connectivity, we require that
the neighborhood of each L2 node include 40 other nodes. This is a reasonable
assumption used by [EG02, CPS03, TCC+06]. We also need to guarantee that the
L1-network (the network of L1 nodes) is connected. Using the area needed for 1000
L2 nodes where the neighborhood of each L2 node has on average 40 nodes, we use
60 L1 nodes where each L1 node is neighbor to 10–15 L1 nodes. At the beginning of
the simulation, each node randomly selects a key ring of size kA = 300 for L1 nodes
and kB = 150 for L2 nodes. Nodes can establish an l-secure connection by sharing
at least l keys.
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We simulated LSBS using the above configuration in [TSN07] by excluding the
L1 nodes. Our results highlighted the shortcomings of LSBS and various practical
issues regarding IG formation that were not dealt with in [LSNBS06]. We summa-
rize these as follows: (1) As the number of shared keys needed to establish a secure
channel decreases, a larger number of initiator groups get created. This leads to high
network communication due to the respective network floods and higher computa-
tion load due to the subsequent encryption and decryption of flooded messages; (2)
There is a sharp transition rate for the number of IGs formed for different key block
sizes m. Fig. B.2(a) shows the jump from very small number of IGs (e.g. m = 5) to
almost 50 IGs when m = 4. However we know that the larger the number of keys
shared between two neighbors, the less resilient the protocol is against neighbor-
compromise. It is thus important to select network parameters such that allow us
to minimize the number of IGs that get created but to also achieve a high degree of
security against both an active and a passive adversary. By introducing hierarchy
in the LSBS scheme, we are able to better control not only the formation of the
local and cluster groups but also the distribution of the group keys. Fig. B.2(b) and
(c) show the probabilities of connection for different local group sizes as well how
much of the neighborhood can establish a pairwise l-secure connection with an L1
node. Our results show that with very high probability, we can achieve a connected
network. In particular, an L2 node can establish a secure connection with an L1
node with very high probability. Fig. B.2(d) graphs the distribution of the size of
the (l, r)-groups centering around each L1 node. Each group on average is made
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Figure B.2: Analysis of LKD scheme
up of one L1 node and three L2 nodes. We emphasize that the size of a group has
no influence on the security of the group key, rather it ensures a more democratic
process since more nodes contribute to the calculation of the group key.
Comparing the performance of LKD and LSBS protocols, the necessary re-
sources of a sensing node is reduced in LKD as:
Reduced communication load. The L2-network is no longer flooded with all
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the partial group keys due to the clustering of the nodes and the management of
the local (l, r) groups by the L1 nodes. In particular, each L2 node, with a high
probability, needs to only connect to the neighboring L1 node. Furthermore if it
falls in an (l, r) group, it needs to exchange O(r) number of messages to generate
a partial cluster and group key. Therefore the number of messages that a sensing
node receives and transmits is no longer a function of the neighborhood size.
Reduced computation load. LKD avoids the need for each sensing node to
perform multiple decryption and re-encryptions when transporting the group key.
In addition the management and decision making required for IG formation has been
avoided and made a responsibility of the powerful L1 nodes. In particular in LKD
with a high probability, each sensing node performs the SSKD protocol once with
the neighboring L1 node. In contrast in LSBS nodes executed the SSKD protocol
with every node in their neighborhood (e.g. in our simulation, this would be 40
times).
Reduced storage space. In LKD sensing nodes do not store the incidence matrix
which is of the order O(k · d) where k is the key ring size and d is the size of the
neighborhood. Nodes also do not need to keep an account of the different local
groups or IGs they belong to.
Finally we note that in LKD, the load on each L1 node is at most equal to
the load on every node in LSBS. Also, the number of times LKD floods the network
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